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The island of Puerto Rico, one of our possessions
in the Cariooean Sea, has been for the past tv/o decades the
suoject of many controversial arguments. At different times,
it has been variously referred to oy American writers and au-
thors as the "stricken land," and as "the island of enchant-
ment" — under which of these two categories it may be clas-
ified, the author feels certain that no one knov/s. It all
depends upon v/hether the v;riter is a cold and scientific econ-
omist who peers through his microscope at the facts of life;
or whether he is an idealist and aesthete seeking the "finer
things in life."
The purpose of this dissertation is to attempt to
discover, and to examine and analyze, the effects of the New
Deal’s "reformation of the sugar industry" on Puerto Rico’s
sugar industry.
There is definitely no abundance of published ma-
terial on this phase of the problem -- most of the books and
publications which have been consulted are either antiquated,
or else, they seem to place most of their emphasis on a study
of Puerto Rico's problems and its sugar industry, with only
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2Much of the material which has been consulted is
obviously biased towards the author’s special interests. In
this category may oe classified some of the publications of
the Association of Sugar Producers of Puerto Rico, and also,
the v;orks of some of Puerto Rico’s social and agrarian re-
formers. Obviously, the above two represent opposite points
of view. Por example, Mr. Dudley Smith, in writing for the
Association of Sugar Producers of Puerto Rico, expresses
mostly the company’s point of view. On the other side of
the ledger, the work of Bird, Pico", and Cordero entitled,
"The Sugar Inaustry in Relation to the Social and Economic
System of Pfierto Rico," presents a different point of viev/.
The tone throughout this work is completely the opposite from
that found in the publications of the Association of Sugar
Proaucers of liierto Rico. There is here no intent to crit-
icize the above gentlemen, and no implication that their v;orks
are of no value — the statistics, records, and data found in
their v/orks are Important and meaningful when examined from
an impartial and purely sc lentme point of view.
Midway between the above tv;o extremes is found the
work of tne Brookings Institution published under the name
of Victor S, Clark and entitled, "Porto Rico and its Prob-
lems." This is a careful and impartial study ana stands prac-
tically by Itself among tne works of its xina. In this cate-
gory, the v;ork of G-ayer, Homan, and James entitled, "The Sugar
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3Economy of Puerto Rico," should also be mentioned. Special
credit must also be given to the statistical material put
out by the different branches of the Government of Puerto
Rico and by the United States Department of Agriculture (Su-
gar Division)
.
The present study is organized along the follovring
lines; A short economic geography of Puerto Rico, and the
importance of its sugar industry are briefly discussed. This
is followed by a treatment of the condition of the sugar in-
dustry at the turn of the ’thirties — the author feels that
this point is of primary importance in understanding why the
government stepped in to regulate the industry. It is at
this point that the more important parts of this dissertation
begin with the treatment of the legislation since 1934, touch-
ing upon sugar and the discrimination of the Island, This is
follov/ed by the treatment of the different features of the su-
gar program and their effects on the sugar industry of Puerto
Rico. In the next to the last chapter, there is an attempt
to bring all of the academic and scientific points of this
study together by way of a practical illustration through the
presentation of an actual case history of a t;>^ical sugar cane
producer. In the conclusion, the important points of this
study are reviewed, and a forecast of v/hat the future holds
in store for Puerto Rico’s sugar industry is made.
Throughout this study, the terms "Agricultural Adjust-
.
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merit Program" and "sugar program" are used synonymously. 'Ihi
is done for the purpose of simplification and to avoid the
complicated phraseology of the former terra.
The author v/ishes to express gratitude to the var-
ious tranches of the United States Department of Agriculture
and of the Government of Puerto Rico, who have graciously
forwarded all printed material which has been requested. To
Professor Max Hartmann, of the Boston University Foreign
Trade Department, a special debt is ov/ed for his advice and
guidance. The author also wishes to express his deepest
gratitude to his father, whose thirty years of business ex-
perience in the sugar cane industry of Puerto Rico have been
put entirely at his disposal. He has read the manuscript,
made valuable criticisms and suggestions, and contributed to
the "practical approach" of the problem.
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5CHAPTER T\\^0
PUERTO RICO Am THE SUGAR INDUSTRY
A Short Economic Geography of Puerto Rico .
In the 3?-ear 1493, Christopher Columbus, in his at-
tempts to find a shorter route to India, landed in Puerto
Rico. He named the island St. John the Haptist. Fifteen
years later, in 1508, Ponce de Leon founded a settlement
there -- history tells us that the riches and v/ealth found
by tnis adventurer of the old world in that tiny island v/ere
such that he named it Puerto Rico (Rich Port)
.
The island
remained under the Spanish regime until 1898 when, as an aft-
ermath of the Spanish-American Var, it became a possession
of the United States,
The island of Puerto Rico, together with several
minor adjacent islands, forms a part of the V/est Indies, and
is the fourth largest in size of the Greater Antilles. It
has an area of approximately 3,435 square miles; the main is-
land being about 100 miles long and 35 miles v/ide. The island
is divided longitudinally by a cordirlera of hills and moun-
tains which runs through its center and reaches, at some points,
a height of 4,000 feet. It is in this region that coffee and
tobacco are grown extensively,
A coastal plain consisting of flat valleys and small
foothills borders this cordillera and extends to the seashore.
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6It is in this coastal plain that the most fertile land in
Puerto Rico is found, and it is here v/here sugar cane is
grovm and cultivated. There are also a nuiriDer of valleys in
the interior where considerable acreage is devoted to sugar
cane production. At this point it may be noted how the cen-
ter of activity of Puerto Rico’s agricultural and industrial
life is grouped around these valleys and flat lands. Dot-
ting the coastal plain, and at intervals of a few kilometers,
the sugar mills, or centrals, are found. There are tv/enty-
seven centrals in the coastal belt and ten in the interior --
an aerial view of these factories shows a complicated system
of dirt and asphalt roads, as well as standard and narrow
gauge railroads radiating from the mill and into tne sugar
lands
.
The climate of Puerto Rico can oe called a tropic-
al one; however, it is far different from v/hat people in the
temperate zones picture it to be. Rather than being hot,
rainy, and stiflingly humid, the climate of the Island could
be aescrioed as dry and pleasantly v/arm. The average temper-
ature throughout the year is 76 degrees Fahrenheit, and there
is not much aifference between summer and winter. This tj^e
of weather is ideal for sugar cane production.
The average rainfall is arouna bo to 70 inches per
year. This figure varies in different sections of tne island,
the rainfall being heavier in the northern coastal belt than
in the southern one -- drought periods in the latter region
ny baat ^tnA al oliJ-.
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7have been partially offset by the use of irrigation.
In 1940, the population of the Island v;as
1,869,000 persons. This represents an increase of 8,5 per-
cent over the 1935 figure, and an annual rate of increase
of 1.89 percent,^ It is this over-population of 545 people
per square mile that has presented a practically insur-
mountable challenge to all attempts at social reform in
that island. Among trie agricultural countries, and v/ith
the exception of Java, Puerto Rico is the most densely pop-
ulated area in the world. Reports of possible increases
in population are actually staggering v/hen one considers
the size of that country -- estimates are for the popula-
tion to reach 3,000,000 people by 1965.^
The political status of the Island is an ambig-
uous one, Not being a territory (as in the case of Hawaii)
it is not eventually automatically eligiole for statehood.
Perhaps the best term which may be applied to the political
relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico is
that the latter is a "partially self-governing possession."
A clear definition of the status of the Island has been one
of the more lively issues of insular politics during the
past decade. Puerto Ricans have been demanding to know
just v;here they stand under the mother country, and v^hether
(1) Descartes, S, L. , Basi c Statistics on Puerto Rico ,
Office of Puerto Rico, Washington, D.C., 1946, p 4,
(2) Ibid .
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8there are possibilities in the near future for recognition
as a dominion or as the forty-ninth state. Of course, the
more radical groups have raised the cry for independence.
The Foraker Act, passed by the United States Con-
gress in 1900, provided for a civil government for the Is-
land, with limitea powers of autonomy. It provided for a
bicameral legislature, v/ith the upper house as the Execu-
tive Council, v;hose members were appointed by the President
of the United States. The Jones Act, passed in 1917, changed
the above and provided for an elective Senate in place of
the Executive Council. This act also provided for the ad-
mission of virtually all Puerto Ricans as citizens of the
United States; and granted the Island a Bill of Rights with
more civil liberties than it had ever enjoyed before. This
included the establishment of the office of Resident Com-
missioner to Washington -- this person is the representa-
tive of the people of Puerto Rico in this country and, al-
though he has no vote, he may sit in the ITational House of
Representatives and express his opinions.
The Insular legislature cannot act upon interna-
tional matters; it cannot raise tariff barriers against
this country. Thus, Puerto Rico enjoys all the benefits
of free trade with the United States, and is subject to the
disadvantages of our tariff v;alls. All tariff revenues,
as well as income taxes, go into the Insular Treasury,
The Governor of Puerto Rico has more or less the
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9same powers as the President under our Constitution — he
heads the Executive branch, is assisted by the Commission-
ers (comparable to cabinet members) who are appointed by
him, with the exception of the Attorney General, the Com-
missioner of Education and the Auditor v/ho are appointed
by the President. The Governor has a veto power over all
legislation; this veto can be overridden by a two-thirds
majority vote of the legislature.
The Director of the Division of Territories and
Island Possessions in the Department of Interior is the
Federal official that is most directly concerned with Puerto
Rican affairs. Although this official has no "direct" ad-
ministrative authority over Insular affairs, he naturally
exercises a great deal of influence through his recommend-
ations to the President.
On the subject of external trade relations, the
value of goods exported from Puerto Rico in 1943 was
^92,196,000, and 95 percent of this amount came to the
United States. For the same year, imports amounted to
^64,697,000, and 7v percent came from the United States.^
In connection v/ith the figure and percentage of imports from
the United States, it must be emphasized that the 1943 am-
ount is not representative of a normal year since during
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from the neighboring countries in the Cariboean area. In
normal years, Puerto Rico purchases from 92 percent to 95
percent of its total imports in the United States market.
The importance of the export-import trade between
the United States and Puerto Rico can be gathered from the
fact that in a representative normal year (1938) only eight
countries imported more from the United States, and only
seven countries exported more to the United States than did
Puerto Rico. Por example, in 1938, the export- import trade
between the United States and Puerto Rico was larger than
that between the United States and France, or Belgium, or
Russia, or Mexico, or China.
^
The relative importance of the Island’s exports
is as follows; sugar, tobacco and tobacco products, cotton
manufactures, and rum. During the war, rum and liquors
took over second place in the value of exports. Principal
imports are foodstuffs, textiles, machinery and chemicals.
The Importance of Sugar to Puerto Rico ’ s Economy .
In order to understand the importance of the ef-
fects of the sugar program on Puerto Rico’s sugar industry
and economy, one must first understand v/hat sugar means to
the Island and the importance and relation of that industry
to the country’s v/elfare. Failure to do this may result in
(l) Horn, Paul V., International Trade Principles and Prac -
tices
, Prentice-Hall Inc., Hew York, 1946, pp 458, 462.

a misinterpretation or tnese economic effects ana tiieir re-
flection on tne economic well-oeing of the total population
of that country.
The economy of Puerto Rico is essentially an ag-
ricultural one, ana lurthermore, it is a one-crop economy.
The depenaence of Puerto Rico on sugar is such that business
conditions in the Island depend entirely on the price com-
manded by that product in the United States market. Sugar
cane is a cash crop, and various experiments carried out in
the Island have shown that the only way that the country
can obtain the funds it needs for the purchase of essential
goods is by devoting its land to the cultivation of inten-
sive cash crops. Eor example, a program to encourage the
local production of foodstuffs in 1918 led to a record plant
ing of 430,000 acres (40 percent of land v/hich can be culti-
vated) to that type of crop. Yet, this record acreage pro-
duced only one-sixth of the local food requirements,^
The following quotation shows hov/ the cultivation
of cash crops ena.bles Puerto Ricans to buy their normal re-
quirements in the mainland markets;
In 1938, Puerto Rico bought aoout 429,000 barrels
of v/heat flour, 352,000 bushels of corn and corn-
meal, and 229,000,000 pounds of milled rice from
the mainland. With 1938 yields, about 151,000
acres v;ere required to grow the wheat used by the





Association of Sugar Producers of luerto Rico,
Washington, D.C., 1939, p 22.
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Island, 138,000 to grow the corn, and 168,000
to grow the rice# On the other hand • • • • •
v/ith bhe returns of about 47,000 acres of su-
gar, Puerto Rico bought the produce of about
384,000 acres of these food crops.
^
The sugar industry of Puerto Rico provides the
main source of income, both direct and indirect, for about
50 percent of the Island’s workers. In 1940, there v;ere
124,000 people employed directly in the sugar cane indus-
try — this figure represents 23 percent of all gainfully
occupied persons.^ It is difficult to measure the indir-
ect dependence of the Island on sugar cane, yet it has been
estimated that it amounts to 30 percent of all gainfully
occupied persons.*^
The industry also provides the largest payroll of
all industries in Puerto Rico; for the past ten years it
has averaged 45 percent of all wages paid in the Island.
The extent to which the Insular welfare depends upon the
industry is shovm by the drop in total payrolls of $6,000,000
\7hich follov/ed a drop in production of 30 percent in 1935.^
In addition to being the principal source of em-
(1) Ibid , p 41.
(2) Descartes, S. L., basic Statistics on Puerto Rico , Of-
fice of Puerto Rico, Vasningoon, D.C., 1946, p 61.
(3) Smith, Dudley and Requa, ¥illi.3m H., Puerto Sugar
Pacts , Association of Sugar Producers of Puerto Rico,
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13
ployment and payrolls in the Island, sugar provides the
principal source of all income. For the past ten years,
the returns from the sugar cane industry have averaged
75,9 percent of all insular income derived from external
sources^ and 20 percent of the Island’s total net income
in 1939-40 (15 percent in 1945-46)
Sugar exports from Puerto Rico averaged 61,5
percent of the total exports from 1940 to 1943, However,
if the exports of the two main derivatives of sugar cane
are considered, molasses a.nd rum, the average percentage
for the same years amounts to 71,6 percent of the total.
^
The contribution of sugar to insular revenues
can be accurately estimated only in its ’’direct" contrib-
ution, The "indirect" contribution -- i,e, payments and
purchases made by people engaged in the sugar industry to
merchants, etc., from which the Insular government derives
revenue in different ways -- is very difficult to measure.
Thus, any figures shov/ing the "direct" contribution of the
sugar industry to government revenue are necessarily an
understatement of the industry’s true and total contrib-
(1) Ibid , p 27
(2) Perloff, Harvey S., Puerto Rico ’ s Economy , (Unpublished
Manuscript), University of luerto Rico, San Juan, P.R.
,
1947, p 17.
(3) Descartes, S, L,, Basic Statistics on Puerto Rico , Of-
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The amount of Insular revenue "directly” contrib-
uted by the sugar industry for the fiscal year 1935-36 is
shov/n in the follov/ing table, Exhibit 1. The amounts sho\m
in column 4, and the corresponding percentages in column
5, are understated since they fail to shov/ such "direct"
contributions as taxes on land and railroads o\med by the
sugar companies (only the receipts of the sugar mills them-
selves are included), and also, individual income tax re-
ceipts from persons who derive their -income directly from
the sugar industry, such as cane growers, employment by
the centrals, etc., is not shoim. Thus, the percentage
figure of 27 percent shoi/n by the exhibit and represent-
ing the "direct" contribution of the sugar industry'' to in-
sular revenues is understated. Had the items omitted un-
der "direct" contributions been included in this exliibit,
this figure would be at least one-third and probably two-
fifths of the total contribution; and if the "indirect"
contribution v/as included, the total contribution of the
sugar industry to Insular revenues would probably reach
50 percent of the total,^
It has been shovm how the economy of Puerto Rico
revolves around the sugar cane industry and the major im-
(l) Grayer, Arthur D., and Homan, Paul T., and James, Earl K.
The Sugar Be onomy of Puerto Rico
,
Columbia University
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portance of that industry in a consideration of the Island’s
v/elfare. With a few exceptions, there are no examples of a
country being so dependent on a major crop as in the case
of Puerto Rico. It is clear that any attempts to regulate
this industry v/ill have serious economic reYerberations on
the whole economj'- and population of Puerto Rico,
Sxliibit 1
























Customs Duties iil690 (plOVV $200 19
Excise 8224 5240 646 12
Property Taxes 6618 6618 2303 35
Income Taxies 1786 1786 758 42
Total vl8318 U14721 $3907 27^
Source: Gayer, Arthur D, and Homan,Paul T.,and James,Sari K.
,
The Sugar Economy of Puerto Rico
,
Columbia University
Press, ITew York, 1938, p 248,
A Uriel Historica.l Development of the Sugar Cane Industry
in Puerto Rico
Sugar cane v/as first brougnt to the new World by
Christopher Coiumous in 1^93, and it is the white man’s
oldest inaustry in one Western hemispnere. In 1515, sugar
cane was introducea in Puerto Rico from the Dominican Re-
public. Thus, the present-day sugar industry of the Island
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is the result of more than 400 years of experience and trial
and error efforts tov^ards improvement.
At the end of the 16th century there were eleven
sugar mills in Puerto Rico, and their total production was
190 tons of sugar. ^ The industry was virtually destroyed
by the hurricane of 1615 and production in 1776 was only
135 tons of sugar per year.^ At the turn of the 20th cen-
tury, sugar production in the Island had increased to about
100,000 tons per year.^
In the early days of the industry, sugar mills
were crude arrangements of wooden machinery usually oper-
ated by the power of animals. The greatest need of the in-
dustry usually v/as the use of capital funds v/ith v/hich to
purchase the modern machinery that v;ould enable it to keep
in stride vrith the modernization programs of other sugar
producing areas. For example, in 1698, there were 345 mills
in Puerto Rico v/ith an average daily production of only 35
tons of cane each.^
Follov/ing the American occupation of Puerto Rico
in 1898, and with the inclusion of the Island within the
(l) Smith, Dudley and Requa, William, Puerto Rico Sugar
Facts
, Association of Sugar Producers of Puerto Rico,
Washington, D.C., 1939, p 2,
(20 Ibid .
(3) Ibid , Statistical Appendix, p 1.
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united States tariff wall, there has been a radical change
in the organization of the sugar industry. The availabil-
ity of the United States money market for the use of cap-
ital funds, and the high price of sugar here made possible
by the protection of the tariff, developed the Island into
one of the major sugar cane producers in the world.
The follov/ing table. Exhibit 2, shov;s production
figures of stigar in Puerto Rico taken at five year inter-
vals. The exhibit has more significance when one points
out that sugar production was restricted in Puerto Rico
from 1935 to 1942 — April 1942, the middle of the "cutting"
season, so that all the crop v/as processed, and the quotas
cannot be considered as being in effect for this year —
and that production did not go over the one million mark
as a result of the war, but had attained this total in
1934,(1,113,000 tons) the year before the program re-
stricting sugar production went into operation. This point
is taken up in detail in a later chapter.
In contrast to the small and inefficient sugar
mills operating in the Island before 1898, .the present-day
organization of the sugar industry'' in Puerto Rico revolves
around the operation of modern and efficient mills, called
centrals. There is a v/ide variation among the production
figures of the different centrals, yet they offer a sharp
(l) Descartes, S, L.
,
Basic Statistics on Puerto Rico , Of-
fice of Puerto Rico, Vashiiigton, D.C., 1946, p 26,





-1^0 5c dfJL' loi >$jflXSCT ro/ OQ oo/i^#j> &dl Ic Vji
%A^‘fi 5: feixf 3 iI;5 iyr*^ ,Hjj,tA'> Xfi4t
|,». T^;: noli^o85s»tM «ri;f xtf




-TdJul 54tJK oirxi rjoiff oXtaifL f’t ssiygil:







tiiOi.lt, t(l SiD^ 0l'l^'S3*t S<4 » 0C I ;^Oi/t>OTCf ^CJgU’itJ i^^rf-f ijyo






v*”>' ^P~i sfiotf tS’o'iXtf (tX 8a £te ii©«X Sit?) o Oc j'oxxoao
I 3f'X£i5 Ko! f CXiS 3/xo Xi'Vo og itj/x flojt>oijlioiqf J^Adt btiu
^ i





- a XJ5^V -Sf(^ ^Q|trx,x},^£CX
.Qpti/i'rQuo cKtcX tnov oolio^uiiott^ Tfc:5A»a g«i;^ix£itn
i* -
j tri riBfvi', jii r^u ax
xs^/xs d=i*ei:aX*fia/iJ: Jb»'ci rSc^ of <S<i^^aco irt i
- L*‘
v: a*-f;t t$^X fficftod ©di n; slllai
O^Twif^L cti xa^sfO l£t t'?'£5jEj6fi<?5Xo *
iiO^'X^jp ,©XX1» (JtJ^iox'rte ui;->. to f£I?i^y ' Tof/o ©ilT feiuro-to





ttaiia *#/£Oilc \o:(^ it&r ^ftdX^rUo ea^ 5c ^STxr^rr'Y
-
‘to y i
r?r”,r^ - ^ ^ .
•
-• t. t
«• » te©^.5oe!>C[ (£)
.<*





















Sources: Smith, Dudley, and Requa, William, ^erto Rico Su-
;^ar Pacts , Association of Sugar Producers of Puerto
Rico, Washington, D.C., 1939, Statistical Appendix, p 1.
Descartes, S. L., Basic Statistics on Pijierto Rico ,




















Source: Perloff, Harvey S., luerto Rico’s Economy
,
(Unpub-
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San Juan, P, R.
, 1947, p 21,
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short tons of sugar, for the four largest mills in the Is-
land, ^:hich include the c o ntmen-cal -ovued Guanica, Aguirre,
and Fajardo Centrals; and for the t\^o sma,llest mills.
Events that Led uhe Sugar Program
The sugar industry is one that has never been
free from the policies, decisions, and actions of govern-
ment, Between lv89 and 1891, the year of -che inauguration
of the PIcKinley Tariff, the major oojective of the tariff
on sugar was to raise revenue for the Federal Treasury,
The McKinley Tariff aoolished this revenue tax (2 cents per
pound) and provided for a bounty to oe paid to continental
proaucers to compensate them lor the admittance of free su-
gar into the United States, In lo94, the government went
back to the policy of a duty on sugar for revenue purposes,
and no bounty.
For the next two decades, the sugar industry had
the advantage of an amazing stability of prices — price
fluctuations were only from 3 l/2 cents to 4 l/2 cents the
pound of sugar. This stability of prices made for steady
returns to grov/ers and producers and for a gradual and con-
tinuous increase in production. During the First World
War, the sugar industry received the full impact of the
economic dislocation which arose from the international
crisis. This dislocation was the result of a program of
rationing and price control of sugar. For the first time
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in America, it was recognized that Jhhis country could not
engage in military v/arfare v/ithout an adequate supply of
sugar. The military argument for high tariffs, that of
protection of the national interests through a stabiliz-
ation of the sugar producing interests of the mainland,
island possessions, and Cuba, was asserted and given val-
idity at this time.
In the years that follov/ed the termination of
the war, sugar prices followed the lead of other raw mate-
rial prices. By 1920, sugar prices in the Hew York market
had reached the astronomico.1 level of 24 cents a pound
(12.0 cents a pound was the average for that year) Tr-^elve
o
months later, the price had dropped to 5 cents a pound.
The industry recuperated partially from this fall in the
market, and by 1924 operations were again at a highly prof-
itable level, Hov/ever, by 1925, sugar prices again began
to fall (See Appendix A) . This drop in prices followed
the \.'’orld pattern of other basic commodities, and it was
coupled with a continuous increase in sugar production,
and the accumulation of large surpluses. If prices were
falling, v/hy did production and the yearly carryover of
stocks increase? The reasons were tv/o — political and
technological. Politically, the various nations of Eur-
ope, notabl 3’" England, had inaugurated a program of art if
-
(l) Descartes, S, L,
,
Basic Statistics on Puerto Rico , Of-
fice of Rierto Rico, Washington, D,C., 1946, p 33.
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icially fostering their heet sugar industries,
logically, the increase in production xTas the result of
the development of heavier and sweeter varieties of cane,
and of an intensive industrialization of the industry.
The follo\/ing table, E:diibit 4, shows that between the
1924-25 and the 1929-50 crops, total sugar supplies in-
creased by 17,3 percent, production increased by 14,5 per-
cent, and prices dropped by 45,2 percent.
Exhibit 4
VOItLD SUGAR PRORUG TIOIT, TOTAL SUPPLIES, AilD PRICES
1924-25 - 1929-30














Source; Ra.lton, John S., Sugar; A Case Study of Govermnent
Control, The Macmillan Co., ITew York, 1937, p 42,""
The crash of the world economic structure in
1929 caught the suga,r industry in a weaPcened position and
exposed it to an attack from three sides, Eirst, the re-
duction in the purchasing pov/er of the consumer brought
about by-'the depression reflected itself in a fall in the
consumption of sugar. Secondly'", sugar prices became de-
pressed in the '‘futures'* market as buyers became hesitant
on future commitments, and sugar stocks began to accumulate.
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Thirdly, the flow of loans from London and Hew York to the
sugar producing areas came to an abrupt stop as the econom-
ic crash depressed the world's money markets.
The deflation of the world sugar price led to
further protection for domestic producers in 1930, as the
Smoot-Hav/ley Tariff Act raised the duty on Cuban sugar to
2 cents per pound. Hov/ever, this tariff could not counter-
act the continuous drop in sugar prices through the early
part of the 'thirties. Despite the drop in prices, produc-
tion in the domestic and insular sugar areas increased by
1,284,000 short tons, or 41 percent, betv/een 1929 and 1933.^
This increase in production, coupled with a decrease in
consLimption in the United States of 606,000 short tons,^
resulted in the crowding out of foreign sugar from the United
States market. Obviously, Cuba was being pushed away from
the united States sugar market.
At this point, it seems pertinent to mention the
heroic attempts made by Cuban producers to stabilize sugar
prices through the restriction of production. The Chad-
bourne Agreement, initiated by the Cuban sugar producers,
called for a restriction of production within a "controlled"
area made up of Cuba, Java, Peru and the beet suga^r produc-
ing countries of Eastern Europe. This group succeeded in
(1) Dalton, John E. , Sugar : A Case Study of G-overnnent Con-
trol , 'i'ne Macmillan Co., Hev/ York, 1937, p 65,
(2) Ibid .
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restricting production between 1930 and 1935 by almost 50
percent,^ However, their purpose was defeated by the ex-
pansion of production in the British anpire and the United
States and its island possessions. The net result was a
drop in the sugar production of only 12 percent,^ and this
v/as not enough to stabilize prices,
V/ith the failure of the Chadbourne Agreement,
conditions in Cuba became desperate. In 1933, that^island
v/as producing its smallest sugar crop since 1911,^ and her
exports \/ere at the lowest level since 1908,^ Cubans were
suffering from actual starvation, and political and social
unrest was such that the island v/as bordering on the state
of anarchy. It was evident the the Uniued States must
come to their aid, either militarily or economically. The
secona method v/as chosen.
As compared to Cuba, the Puerto Rican sugar cane
industry was not in such a disastrous condition in 1933,
Production of sugar in the Island increased by 41 percent
between 1929 and 1933,^ and there was a steady market in the
United States that absorbed this increase in supplies, A.1-
(1) Dalton, John E. , Sugar ; A Case Study of Governmental Con-
trol
,
The Hacmillan Co., Hew York, 1937, p 55,
(2) Ibid .
(3) Ibid , p 251,
(4) Ibid .
(5) -Descfihte's,. S. L., Basic Statistics on Puerto Rico
,
Of-
fice of luerto Rico, 1/ashington, D.C., 1946, p 26,
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so to be emphasized is the fact that Puerto Rican sugar,
unlike Cuban sugar, v/as fully -protected under the united
States tariff system. 'vVhile Cuban producers irere receiv-
ing a price of less than 1 cent a pound for their sugar in
1933, Puerto Rican producers were receiving close to 3
cent a pound,
^
Despite the relatively advantageous position of
the Ptierto Rican sugar cane industry, there v/ere other fac-
tors in the Island that were partially to blame for an ec-
onomic, social, and political depression similar to that in
other sugar-economy countries. The Hurricane of 1928
ruined the Island’s coffee crop and reduced production by
p
86 percent between 1928 and 1930. A second hurricane in
1932 aggravated this condition. This depression, from the
economic sense, was evidenced by the drop in value of the
Island’s export-import trade and the general lag of busi-
ness activity. Socially, it was evidenced by poverty and
the near-s±arva,t ion condition of the masses of the people.
Politically, it was evidenced by disorder and the revival
of the theory of independence.
By I’larch 1933, when the new Democratic Adminis-
tration came into office, it was already evident to all
(1) Dalton, John E, , Sugar
:
A Case Study of Government Con-
trol , The Macmillan Co., Hew York, 1937, p 253
(2) Descartes, S. L, , Basic Statistics on Puerto Rico , Of-
fice of luerto Rico, V/ashington, D.C., 1943, p 26.
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parties concerned that the tariff system on sugar had
failed to achieve its purpose, Tlie case in the Uniued
States v;as different from that in some European countries,
which v/ere aole to protect successfully their oeet sugar
industries. Here, the problem vras not only that of pro-
tecting the Oeet producers of the Vest, but also, the su-
gar cane interests of Louisiania and Florida, and the in-
sular areas of Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico,
The theory behina the tariff had been the difference in
production costs between the different sugar areas, and
all the areas involved had radically diiferent production
costs, Tnx^j was one of the main factors that made the
tariff an unvrorlcable one.
Before giving consideration to the original Hev;
Beal proposals for regulating the sugar industry, some
funaamental facts dealing v/ith the relation of tnis indus-
try to the governraent must oe pointed ouo. These are as
follov/s
1, The channels of production and distrioution of
sugar are relatively few, and it is easy to con-
trol and regulate both,
2, Sugar is a cheap commodity, and tariff protection
tenas to increase its price,
(l) Some of this material has been gathered from the book
by; Balton, John E,, Sugar
;
A Case Study of Government
Control , The Macmillan Co,, Hew York, 1937.
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o , since sugar is a cheap food, and it is also a
necessary item to the diet, its demand could
be said to be relatively inelastic. A high-
er price in sugar v/ill increase total receipts,
since consumption will not decrease appreciably.
4. Cane and beet sugar are in constant competition,
\Ih±le cane sugar is produced in the bac]a^rard,
tropical areas, beet sugar is produced in many
of the heavily industrialized countries. Since
the latter are usually in a more advantageous
economic position to make tariff demands, the
beet sugar producer has alv/ays been, relatively,
in a better position than has the cane sugar
producer.
5. The sugar industry is of military importance, and
the militarjT' argument for protection has been
applied to it at different times.
In April, 1933, the United States Tariff Commis-
sion acknowledged the failure of our sugar policy. In its
Letter to the President, the Commission recognized the fol
lowing facts, some of v/hich were later incorporated into
the Sugar Act of 1934.^
1. A duty on sugar that is based on the difference
(l) United States Tariff Commission, Rerort to the Presi -
dent on Sugar , Report ,j^73 , V/ashington, L.C., 1934,
p 25.
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in production costs betv/een domestic and foreign
areas is not a feasible one.
2. A raise in the tariff duty v/ill not solve this
sugar crisis.
3. A higher price for sugar is a necessary factor
for the reinstatement of prosperity in the sugar
industry.
4. Sugar import into the United States must-be re-
stricted before the price of this commodity can
be raised.
5. The Cuba,n duty shoud be reduced, provided that
their sugar exports to the United States are lim-
ited,
\vhen the original Agricultural Adjustment Admin-
istration Act was accepted by Congress in the spring of
1933, sugar beets and sugar cane were not included among
the basic commodities v/hich the Secretary of Agriculture
had the pov/er to control. Faced with this situation, the
sugar producers supplying the United States liarket, with
the cooperation of the Secretary of Agriculture, v/orked
out their own plan for the rationalization of the produc-
tion and marketing of sugar and called it the Stabiliza-
tion Agreement. The program included the following points;^
1. A minimitm price for sugar v;as to be fixed ac-
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cording to a pre-determined fomula.
2, The production of sugar was to "be coordinated with
its consumption.
3. A control over the production of sugar was prov-
ided for in very vague terms.
A few months after its inauguration, the Stabil-
ization Agreement was officially rejected by the Secretary
of Agriculture. The reasons were various — the Agreement
tended to oenefit the processor and not the farmer; the
clause calling for the control of production v;as very
loosely and vaguely dravm; it; aid not offer sufficient as-
sist;ance to the Cuban sugar cane industiy; and it had no
effective means of enforcement.
This was the situation in the sugar industry
just prior to the inauguration of the New Deal’s sugar
program. It is clear that the condition of the sugar
interests supplying the United States market was a chaot-
ic one. The government’s purpose was not to aim future
legislation towards the benefit of any one particular area,
but rather for the good of all producers supplying this
market. It is pointed out later, hox^ever, that this was
not the case, since certain areas derived greater benefits,
and others were discriminated against.
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TliE AGRICuXTURAL AXJUSTIISirT i\ITIIlTISTRATIOH PROCRAI-I —
DISCRXmiATIOH AGAINST TEE PUERTO RIGA]:!
SUGAR INDUSTRY
In the previous section, the chaotic sta.te of
the sugar industry in the year 1933 has been discussed. By
the spring of 1934, when the first full year of general
business recovery in the United States had failed to bring
a domestic increase in sugar consumption, the pessimism of
the people in the sugar industry reached alarming levels.
It is important to remember that, in the spring
of 1934, the original Agricultural Adjustment Act had been
in operation for one full year; and also, that sugar cane
and sugar beets v/ere not among the products included in
the original Act. In the spring of 1933, the government
had inaugurated a program of voluntary crop restriction;
and cotton, wheat, corn, and tobacco were the four prod-
ucts included in the Act at that time. As a compensation
for the voluntary restriction of production, the govern-
ment had agreed to make certain payments to farmers. In
other words, the quota system of crop restriction, and the
benefit payments to compensate farmers for their curtail-
ment of production, were inaugurated at that time.
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industry, the President reconmiended to Congress that the
emergency be met by legislative and administrative action
along the follo\.ang lines
1, An amendment of xhe Agricultural Adjustment Act
to include sugar cane and sugar beets among the
basic commodities.
The establishment of a tax on sugar processing;
and the use of the proceeds of this ta-X to cover
the expenses of benefit pajmients.
3, A second amendment to the Act that would grant
the Secretary of Agriculture the pov/er to issue
licenses to refiners, handlers, and importers of
, sugar. This was a procedure to restrict the
amount of sugar, cane or beet, sold in the Amer-
ican market,
4, The reduction of the tariff duty on Cuban sugar
was called for. This was to oe accomplished in
two steps -- an initial reduction from 2 cents
per pouna to 1.5 cents per pound; to be followed
by a second reduction to .9 cents per pound.
It is known that, in the spring of 1934, Congress
v/as involved in the formulation of legislation of tremen-
dous national scope and importance. The tendency of Con-
(l) Li^nasky, Myer, Sugar Economics , Statis u.lcs and hncu-
ment
s
, The United States Cane Sugar Refiners’ Assoc-
iation, 193S, pp 130, 140.
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gress had been to accept the leadership of the Chief ut:ec-
utive and to embody his recommendations into law without
delay. Since the sugar program merely called for am amend-
ment to the original Agricultural Adjustment Act by the in-
clusion of sugar cane and sugar beets as basic commodities,
the President’s recommendations v/ere almost v/holly accepted
and embodied into law. The only exception was that the
quota adopted by Congress for the United States’ producers
vra.s larger than that recommended by the president.
At this point, the national legislation since
1934 affecting the sugar industry, as adopted by the United
States Congress, is discussed in detail. The two main
parts of this legislation v/ere the Sugar Act of 1934 and
the Sugar Act of 1937; how'ever the yearly orders of the
Secretary of Agriculture and the Sugar Act of 1948 are also
touched upon. Por the sake of conciseness, this discussion
is limited to the more important phases of the program.
The Sugar Act of 1934^
This is an act to include sugar beets and
sugar cane as basic agricultural commodities
under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and for
other purposes.
The Act gave the Secretary of Agriculture the
power to reduce the production of certain basic agricul-
tural commodities, i,e, sugar cane and sugar beets, through
(l) United States Statutes at Large, 73rd Congress,
Kay, 1934, pp 670-678.
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voluntary contracts \;ith producers and, in this connection,
provided for benefit payments, at the discretion of the
Secretary, to be paid out of funds available for this pur-
pose.
Revenues for expenses arising in this connection
were met by the levying of processing taxes, i.e. taxes on
the processing of sugar cane and sugar beets. This tax
. . .
shall be at such rate as equals the dif-
ference between the current average farm price
for the commodity and the fair exchange value
of the commodity.
In other words, this is the parity principle of pricing.
The Secretary was given the povrer to enter into
marketing agreements with processors, handlers, etc. of
the various basic agricultural commodities. In the case
of sugar cane and sugar beets, this meant the sugar cane
mills and refiners, and the sugar beet processors and re-
finers, The processors (and refiners) were issued oper-
ating licenses which could be revoked upon violation of
the Act; and also, they were subject to a fine of not more
than (plOOO for each day during \'hich the violation contin-
ued, In other words, this is the quota system, or, as it
is sometimes called, "the rationalization of marketing."
The licensing of processors included all domes-
tic processors of sugar cane and sugar beets, and all su-
gar cane processors in the Territory of Hav/aii
,
Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands, However, the fact that oth-
er areas supplying the United States sugar market were not
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included in the licensing system did not preclude them from
conforming to the program of production restriction, inso-
far as their sugar exports to the United States v/ere con-
cerned, The processing quotas for domestic beet sugar and
cane sugar producers were determined by an act of Congress,
v;hile those for the other areas supplying the continental
market v/ere left up to the detemination of the Secretary
of Agriculture. Heedless to say, the sugar beet bloc ex-
erted pressure in Congress for a quota larger than that
v/hich had been assigned to that section by the President
in his original message to Congress,
The follov/ing table. Exhibit 5, shows the origi-
nal quotas reconmiended by the President, the quotas estab-
lished by the Sugar Act of 1934, and the percentage of change.
Exhibit 5









U.S. Beet Sugar 1,450 1,556 7.3
U.S. Cane Sugar 260 261 .5
Cuba 1,944 1,902 - 2.2
Philippine Islands 1,037 1,015 - 2.1
Kav/aii 935 917 - 1.9
Puerto Rico 821 803 - 2.2
Virgin Islands 5 5 —
All Others 0 17 —
Source: Dalton, John E
. ,
Sugar i A Case Study of Government
Control
,
The Macmillan Co , , Nev/ York, H.,Y., 1957,
p 123.
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It is clear that the demands from the sugar bloc
in the United States v;ere met by a corresponding decrease
in the quota of every other sugar producing area.
Provisions v/ere also made in the Act to change
the respective quotas of the different sugar producing
areas if the need arose. For example, if the Secretary de-
termined that the sugar consumption requirements in the
United States would be more than otherwise estimated, this
change would be distributed among the different producing
areas on a pro-rata basis, with the proviso that the dom-
estic areas v/ould not receive less than 30 percent of this
increase. If, during any one year, one or more of the su-
gar areas supplying the continental market was unable to
meet its quota requirements, this deficit was to be made
up by a corresponding increase in the quota of the other
areas for that year.
The processing taxes collected from the process-
ing of sugar cane in the insular possessions were not to
be included in the general fund of the United States Treas-
ury, but rather, were to be held in a separate trust fund
under the name of the area from which they vj’ere collected,
to be used for the benefit of agriculture and/or benefit
payments in such areas.
The Act also regulated and limited the employ-
ment of child labor, and mentioned the setting of a min-
imum v;age standard, Hov/ever, it did not provide for strong
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enough penalties for failure to obey these labor regula-
tions .
The Sugar Act of 1934 corrected the weak points
of the Stabilization Agreement, It is recalled from the
previous chapter that the reasons for the failure of this
Agreement were that it benefited the processor and not the
famer; the method used to bring about production restric-
tion was a weak one; and it had no effective means of en-
lorcement
•
The Act did away with the above v;eaknesses by
providing for benefit payments to farmers; the establish-
ment of a tight control over production and processing, in-
creasing the Cuban sugar quota by 200,000 short tons, and
reducing the tariff on Cuban sugar from 2 cents per pound
to .9 cents per pound; and by providing for stiff penalties
for failure to foliov; the regulations set up under the Act.
The government had succeeded in its purpose --
the rehabilitation of the sugar industry had been accom-
plished, In January, 1936, when the sugar crisis was over,
the United States Supreme Court disproved the theory that
the federal government had the power to regulate agricul-
tural crop production. This decision crushed the Adminis-
tration’s policy of benefit payments for crop restriction.
Yet, it had no bearing on the rest of the program, since
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the quota system could still be used to restrict the
marketing: of a product.
Despite the unconstitutionality of certain fea-
tures of the Sugar Act of 1934, as stated by the Supreme
Court in January, 1936, the quotas continued in operation
through 1937. This v/as accomplished by a Joint Resolution
of Congress. The 1936-37 crop v/as not covered by benefit
payments since the method of raising funds for these paj/-
ments (the processing tax) had been also declared uncon-
stitutional by the Supreme Court the previous year. Hov/-
ever, payments to Puerto Rican Pamers for this crop v/ere
made under the Soil Conservation Act.
Paced v/ith the expiration of the Sugar Act of
1934, and v/ith the unconstitutionality of some of its fea-
tures, the Administration prepared some nev/ sugar legisla-
tion. The result v-/as the Sugar Act of 1937.
The Sugar Act of 1937^
This is an act ... to regulate commerce among
the several states, v/ith the territories and
possessions of the United States, and v/ith
foreign countries; to protect the v/elfare of
consumers of sugar and of those engaged in the
domestic sugar producing industry.
The Secretary of Agriculture is to determine the
amount of sugar needed to meet the requirements of the
United States’ consimiers for each calendar year. \/henever
(l) United States Statutes at Large, 75th Congress,
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a determination of sugar consumption is made, the Secre-
tary is to assign quotas to the different areas on the
following basis; the domestic areas are to receive 55.59
percent of the total, yet not less than 3,715,000 tons of
sugar (Hote: Por this purpose, the "domestic" areas in-
clude both the area of the United States and its insular
possessions). Foreign countries, and the Philippines, are
to receive the remaining 44.41 percent.
Percent of
Domestic Area 55 . 59p
Domestic Beet Sugar 41.72








Foreign Countries other than Cuba .89
If the foregoing tabulations v/ere expressed in
terms of the percentage which each area has of the total






Cuba 28 . 60




Mainland Cane Sugar 6.29





The Secretary has the power to determine the
amount of sugar needed for local consumption in Hawaii,
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and to set aside sep-
arate amounts for local use accordingly. If any one area
is unable to fill its assigned quota in a given year, the
deficiency is to be pro-rated for that year among the oth-
er areas on a predetermined basis.
The maximum amount of refined sugar (known as
direct consumption sugar) which can be included as part of
the quota for each offshore area is specified in the Act.
The Act also assigns to Cuba and the Dominican Republic
quotas for liquid sugar.
The Act provides for benefit payments to beet and
cane grov/ers in the United States, the Virgin Islands, and
Puerto Rico. However, as a condition for these payments,
producers must comply with certain conditions applicable to
labor, minimum v;age rates, and soil conservation practices.
These points are later taken up in detail in tv/o separate
chapters
.
Benefit payments are based on the hundredv/eight
of sugar or liquid sugar, raw value, and are calculated ac-
cording to the following rates:
Short Tons Produced, Rate of Payment per
Rav7 Value Hundredweight, Raw Value
0 500 ^ .60^
500 1500 .55
1500 6000 .525
6000 - 12000 .50
12000 - 30000 .475
Over 30000 .30
Since 1943, the initial payment has risen

An excise tax of 0,460 cents per pound on all
manufactured sugar (sugar wnich is nor to oe further re-
fined) testing 92 sugar degrees; and of u.ol4 cents per
pound on all manufactured sugar testing less than 92 su-
gar degrees, v/ere to be provided for by the Act, The
processor of sugar is to be held responsible for this
tax.
The Orders of the Secrerary of Agriculture
This topic has to do with the different orders
of the Secretary of i\griculture in conformance \-/ith the
powers granted him by Congress under the Sugar Acts, i.e,
the determination of yearly quotas, etc. There is an ab-
undant v/ealth of material issued b3^ the Agricultural Ad-
justment Administration dealing with this phase of the
problem — between 1934 and 1947, several hundred releases
were issued. Limiting the discussion to the case of Puerto
Rico, v/e find that there were two important details covered
in the Puerto Rico Sugar Order (P,R,S,0,) for these years,
Pirst of all, between 1936 and 1939, the j’^earl in
which the quotas were temporarily suspended, the yearly
carryover of sugar stocks forced Puerto Rican sugar pro-
ducers to produce an amount that V7as actually less than
that called for by the quota regulations, and to make up
this difference with the sale of accumulated stocks. Of
course, this whole situation was completely regulated by
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the Secretary of Agriculture, as he determined the amount
of the quota that was to be met out of the sales of accum-
ulated stocks. In 1939, v/ith the temporary suspension of
the quotas, Puerto Rican producers v/ere able to sell these
extra sugar stocks.
The second important point covered by these or-
ders v/as the actual quotas of sugar for Puerto Rico. As
has been mentioned previously, under the Sugar Act of 1934,
the Puerto Rican quota was determined by the Secretary of
Agriculture; and under the Sugar Act of 1937, it v/as also
determined by him, with the proviso that a special pre-
agreed upon formula v/as follov/ed. The ''quota" phase of
the problem is taken up in a later chapter.
The Sugar Act of 1937, although supposed to ex-
pire in 1940, v/as extended "for the duration of the v/ar
emergency." The quotas v/ere suspended in April, 1942, as
a result of the v/orld sugar shortages created by the v/ar,
yet the benefit pa^nnents to producers, and other features
of the Act continued in operation.
The Sugar Act of 1948, v/hich is to be effective
for five years -- until December 31, 1952, embodies the
same features as the Act of 1937, v/ith the exception that
larger quotas have been assigned to the different market-
ing areas. The follov/ing quotas for the year 1948 have































Discrimination of Puerto Rico Under the Sugar Program
The marketing quota for P uerto Rico Under the
Sugar Act of 1934 v/as established on the basis of the Is-
land’s sales during the three base years of 1931, 1932,
and 1933. The industrj''’s contention is that the base years
used in allocating this quota were not representative of
the Island’s true capacity to produce.
Prior to 1925, the Puerto Rican sugar industry
had been pla.gued by disease, and the resulting damage to
crops was evidenced through the late ’twenties in the total
sugar production of the Island. A second factor that had
restricted production of sugar in the Island was the v/ea-
ther conditions. The hurricane of 1928 damaged the SLigar
crop to the extent of causing a drop in production of 32
percent betv/een 1928 and 1929 (See Appendix B) . A second
hurricane in 1932 affected the Island’s sugar crop
;^oA 'isj ‘xotm^ iK-'tKf-
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and brought about a drop in production of 16 percent be-
tween 1932 and 1933 (See Appendix B) . Production of sugar
in the sections located in the path of the vortex of this
hurricane was 35 percent below normal,^ The drought per-
iod between April, 1930, and March, 1931, v/hen the rain-
fall v;as 27 percent^ belovr normal for the Island as a
whole, reduced production by 10 percent between 1930 and
1931 (See Appendix B)
.
In writing about the drought period of 1930-31,
Mr. Dudley Smith, of the Association of Sugar Producers of
Puerto Rico, states that "the damage from the drought to-
tailed approximately 200,000 tons" — this is the equiv-
alent of a 23 j)ercent drop in production. The author be-
lieves that this claim is exaggerated. The only conditions
under which this statement could be held valid is if one
considered the probable expansion of sugar production in
the Island had not the drought affected the crop. However,
since there is no scientific manner of proving this prob-
able expansion in production under normal weather conditions,
the conservative estimate of a 10 percent drop in produc-
tion as a result of the drought appears correct.
(1) Smith, Dudley and Requa, Villiara, Puerto Rico Su,g:ar
Pacts
,
Association of Sugar Producers of Puerto Rico,
V/ashington, D.C., 1939, p 108.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid .
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The reader may reason that the quota estimates
for Iherto Rico determined by the Secretary of Agriculture
were correct, since it took into account probable drops in
production as a result of cane diseases, hurricanes, and
droughts. There is no reason to believe that this is the
case. Cane diseases in Puerto Rico had been conquered by
1925, thanks to the v;ork of the Agricultural Experimental
Stations, and the development of disease-resistant var-
ieties of cane. These precluded any further trouble from
this source. Contrary to common opinion, hurricanes pass
through Puerto Rico on the average of only one every ten
years — the Island has not suffered from the effects of a
serious hurricane since 1932. Here reference is made to
the actual path of the vortex of the hurricane, since it
is this condition which causes the actual damage. It has
been estimated that the Island does not suffer from actual
general drought conditions on more than one out of every
six or eight years. Between the drought year of 1930-31,
which seriously affected the 1931 crop, and the year 1947,
there have been only two serious drought periods in Puerto
Rico — they affected the 1936 and 1944 crops respectively.
The foregoing shows that, if the after-effects of
cane diseases and v/eather factors harmfully affected the
sugar crops of Puerto 'Rico in 1929, 1931, and 1935, and quo-
tas based on the production figures for the years 1931,
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land’s true capacity to produce. It v/as truly unfortun-
ate that such "cjiance" factors as hurricanes and droughts
ho.d to affect the sugar crops in the years v/hich were la-
ter selected as the basis for the determination of the quo-
tas. Also, production figures for the years prior to 1930
v/ould not have been representative, because during those
years the Island’s sugar crop had been recovering from the
after-effects of cane diseases.^
In establishing production quotas for Puerto P.ico
,
the Secretary of Agriculture should have arrived at a fav-
orable adjustment for a measurable factor such as the
weather. The factor of cane diseases, and its effect on
the crops of the base years of 1931, 1932, and 1933, is
very difficult to measure since cane diseases have been
conquered since 1925 and there are no adequate estimates on
how the sugar crops subsequent to that year were effected
by the after-effects of this element. Por the sake of ac-
curateness and conservativeness, the cane disease factor is
not considered in the following tabulation showing how the
adjustment should have been made.
In terms of the adjustment whieh has been sug-
(l) The "after-effects of cane diseases" refers to the
necessarily low volume of production while the indus-
try v/as recovering from the disease years and planting
disease-resistant varieties of cane -- this does not
necessarily mean a lov/ rate of sugar yield or of sugar
cane per acre.
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gested below, the base quota for Puerto Rico v;ould have
been larger under the Sugar Act of 1934 by approximately
8.2 percent; it would have been approximately 871,000 tons
rather than the 807,312 tons that v;ere assigned to the Is-
land. Although this 8.2 percent may seem like a small am-
ount, it would have gone a long v;ay in helping to solve
many of the Island’s economic problems.
Exhibit 6
(i'UOTA ADJUSTl'IEETT POR THE \vOiIATHER FACTOR IH PUERTO RICO
Sugar Production Hurricane Drought True
Year in Tons Factor Factor Ad,1ustment
1931 787,796 Plus 10^^ 866,575
1932 992,433 — — 992,433





The following tabulation, where the production,
quota figure, and variation between the two for the years
1935-39 in the United States and its island possessions
have been considered, helps to prove the fact that the
quotas assigned to Puerto Rico were lower than they shoii.ld
othen/ise have been
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VAPaATIONS EROL'I THE Q.UOTA — 1935-1941
(in thousands of tons)
Year
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941
Puerto Rico
j,uota 79 90 90 82 81 80 108
Production 79 93 100 108 85 102 93
% Change + -
Hav/aii
T^uota 93 103 98 92 95 94 126
Production 99 104 94 99 97 94 87
% Change + + * 4 4“ —
u,S. Beet
<;^uota 155 134 142 158 157 155 209
Production 119 130 139 137 180 176 190
% Change - - - - 4- -
U#S, Cane
s^uota 26 39 47 43 42 42 57
production 38 43 43 46 58 50 33
% Change 4 4 - 4 -
Sources; Descartes, S.L., Basic Statistics on Pu.erto Rico
,
Office of Puerto Rico, V/ashingron D.C., 1946
pp 26,27.







U.S. Cane Sugar Refiners’ Association, 1938,
pp 33, 41, 49,
Perloff, Harvey S., Puerto Rico ’ s Economy
,
(Unpub-
lished Manuscript), University of Puerto Rico, San
Juan, Puerto Rico, 1947, p 25,
The follov/ing points in onis table must be ex-
plained, The plus figures for the years 1935 to 1940 for
: r.r)
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Hawaii and Puerto Kico are tJie result of extra sugar pro-
duced in those areas above the quotas, for local consump-
tion, ana of deficiencies in other areas which were as-
signed to them on a pro-rata basis. Plus signs on United
States sugar cane production v;ere also the result of de-
ficiencies . in otJrier producing areas which were partly made
up by increased production in this area. The plus signs
for 1939 in all areas should be discounted, since the quotas
were temporarily suspended during part of that year. The
minus signs for 1941 in all areas must also be discounxed
since the quotas were increased near the end of that year
and none of the sugar producing areas was able to meet this
increase
.
Taking zhe foregoing facts into consideration, the
exhioit shows that Puerto Rico did not fail to meet its quo-
ta requirements during any one year. Both the Hawaiian and
the united States cane producers failed to meet tneirs in
one year — 1937. The most disparaging results are obtained
from the production figures of the United States beet pro-
ducers, v/ho failed to meet tneir quota of production aunng
four successive years -- 1935, 1936, 1937, and 1938. The
author believes in the inalienable rights of the American
farmer to the United States market, yet these results are
considerably out of proportion with those in other producing
areas
•
Another point which shows the discrimination suf-
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fered by the Puerto Rican industry is gathered by a compar-
ison of the share of the United States market alloted to
the Island under the Sugar Act of 1934 and under the Sugar
Act of 1937. It has already been poinited out hov; Puerto
Rico’s quota was excessively low under the Act of 1934, At
that time, Puerto Rican producers were allowed a share of
12.4 percent of the continental market. Under the Act of
1937, this share was further reduced to 11,9 percent, and
then to 11.7 percent under the Act of 1948. As contrasted
to this condition, the Cuban share of the United States’
market was increased from 28.6 percent under the Act of 1937
to 41.0 percent under the Act of 1948, Por the other areas,
the percentage change was negligible. In other v/ords, Cuba
has received the lion’s share of the continental market.
In concluding this section, it must be pointed
out that the case of discrimination against Puerto Rico in
the determination of quotas is even stronger when one con-
siders the Island’s dependence on the sugar industry — a
dependence which is stronger than that of any other sugar
producing area in the world. However, the fact that the
Puerto Rican sugar industry v/as discriminated against does
not necessarily mean that the industry found itself in a
more disadvantageous financial position under the sugar pro-
gram that it had been before the inauguration of this pro-
gram. The question of discrimination is considered here
only on a relative basis and on a comparison with the other
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sugar producing areas; and per se , it must not be interpre
ted to mean a disadvantageous financial position of the Is
land's sugar industry as compared to the years before the
sugar program. It does mean, however, a disadvantageous
position under the sugar program as compared to other pro-
ducing areas.
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THE EFEBCTS OP THE QUOTAS ON THE INDUSTRY
The quota system was first inserted into the
picture of Puerto Rican sugar production during the crop
year 1934-35, With different yearly variations in the am-
ounts of the quota, the system continued in operation un-
til the spring of 1942,^ with the exception of a brief in-
terlude of a short non-quota period in the latter part of
1939 v/hich allowed producers to dispose of their accumul-
ated sugar inventories. Actually, in terms of production,
4
volume, the quotas should not be considered as being in ef-
fect for the crop year 1941-42 since they were removed in
. pApril, 1942, the middle of the "cutting" season and all
of the cane from that crop was processed. However, since
the quotas were removed suddenly a,nd without previous warn-
ing at that time, the crop of 1941-1942 should be cohsid-
(1) Other features of the sugar program, hov/ever, contin-
ued in operation,
(2) The "cutting" season for sugar cane starts, in Puerto
Rico, around the middle of December and lasts until May
or June of the following year, A crop year is some-
times referred to on the basis of two years (December
to June), In a practical sense, it should be referred
to on the basis of one year since only about 5 percent
of production takes place in December and the remaining
95 percent takes place in the first six months of the
year following that December,
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ered as a quota crop in discussing such related factors
that preceded the crop as, cultivation intensity, land un-
der cultivation, etc. These are discussed in the latter
part of this section.
Although the first crop actually affected by the
quotas was the 1934-35 crop, there was a carry-over of su-
gar stocks from the previous crop during that year. The
quota system had not applied in a true sense to the 1933-
1934 crop since it had been put into operation on a date
that was too late to affect the actual harvesting of the
crop 0 (December 1933 to May 1934). However, since the sys-
tem went into operation in the summer of 1934, it affected
the marketing of the 1933-34 crop. In other v/ords, the
program of crop restriction did not affect the sugar grower
or colono,^ insofar as his 1933-34 crop was concerned; it
affected the mill-operators who found themselves unable to
market a part of the sugar produced by their land and by
the growers affiliated with their mills.
At the beginning of 1935, there was a surplus
carry-over of sugar in the Island’s ^^rarehouses, that is, a
surplus in excess of the 1934 marketing quota, of about
(1) A "colono" is an independent sugar cane planter and
grower, who owns or leases his land, and has his
produce processed by a sugar mill on a contractual
basis. The mill usually buys the sugar produced by
the colono on a month-to -month basis, and later sells
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288.000 tons.^ The quota for 1935, as originally estab-
lished, would have left a surplus of cane in the fields of
285.000 tons -- this amount, when coupled with the inven-
tories of the previous year , ^amounted to a grand total of
513.000 tons (in both field and warehouse),
For purposes of reducing these inventories, the
original harvesting quota given 'Co Puerto Rican producers
in 1935 was further reduced to 788,000 tons. Producers
were given a $4 payment for each ton of cane that exceeded
their quota and remained uncut. Fortunately for the indus-
try, this uncut cane was not destroyed. Part of it was
converted into blackstrap molasses and syrups, and tne re-
mainder was carried over until the following year when a
larger quota made possible its conversion into sugar. In
other words, producers were given a payment for each ton
of cane that remained uncut in compliance with the sugar
program. The following year, they were given another pay-
ment on the portion of that cane which was processed into
sugar — this amounted to tv/o benefit jjayments for the same
portion of the same crop.
The quota for 1936 saw an increase over that for
the previous year, as it was set at 909,445 tons. In sud-
sequent years, the surplus sugar stocics carried over irom
the previous years fluctuated witn changes in local con-
^l) Dalton, John E,
,
Sugar; A Case Stuuy of Government
Control , The Macmillan Company, hew York, iy37, p 220,
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sumption, and in iy39, with the temporary suspension of
the quotas, the industry was able to dispose of its accum-
ulated sugar inventories. In April, 1942, the quotas were
definitely suspended; and they have been established again
for the 1947-48 crop. Appendix C shows a complete tabula-
tion of the sugar quotas for Puerto Rico.
The quota system has affected several phases of
the Island’s sugar industry — these include the following
points: production, acreage harvested, sugar cane and su-
gar yields, and the flow of investments.
Slack in Production
The trend of grovrth of sugar production in Puerto
Rico is evident upon examination of the Island's production
figures for the years that preceded the establishment of
the quotas, the quota years, and the war years (Appendix
B).
The graph shov/n on page 56 illustrates this trend.
It is evident that the tendency of groirth slackened during
the quota years from the point it had reached in the years
before the program went into effect; and that this situation
is accentuated during the war years. Is it to be concluded
that production drops between 1943 and 1945, during a per-
iod v/hen the quotas v/ere not in operation, indicated that
the levelling off of the production curve in the late 'thir-
ties and the early part of the 'forties was not a result of
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the quota program, but rather, an inherent characteristic
of the industry which showed that the saturation point of
production had been reached? Definitely not. Production
drops in the latter part of the war years and during the
first post-v/ar years can be directly traced to a shortage
of fertilizer — Puerto Rico imports most of its fertil-
izer from the United States, and there has been an acute
shortage of that chemical commodity in this country. Fur-
thermore, the industry has been operating at a point far
below its saturation point, and there is no reason to be-
lieve that there is an inherent tendency for production to
level off. Different experts’ estimates have placed the
sugar production capacity of the Island, under normal pro-
duction and marketing conditions, at a minimum of 1,500,000
tons of sugar (about 12,000,000 tons of sugar cane), and
probably more.^
The Stagnation of Sugar Acreage Harvested
Statistics in Appendix D show how the amount
of sugar acreage harvested in Puerto Rico was practically
"frozen" under the sugar program. With very monor varia-
tions for the different years, which were the result of
differences in sugar yields, (and hence, differences in the
(l) Perloff, Harvey S., Puerto Rico ’ s Economy
,
(Unpublished
Manuscript). The University of Puerto Rico, San Juan,
Puerto Rico, 1947, p 26.
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amount of cane ground to cover the sugar quota) , the inher-
ent characteristocs of certain productive units, and of
minor quota grants made to a number of new, small producers,
the total sugar acreage harvested in the Island, for prac-
tical purposes, did not change during the quota years —
the total change being plus 2,3 percent. Furthermore, the
largest change for any two year period v/as plus 1,7 percent
for 1939-40, (Note: It is important to remember that quota
increases, as determined by the Secretary of Agriculture,
were sometimes met by the disposal of accumulated sugar
stocks and not by the increase of actual production,)
The necessary effect of the "freezing” of sugar
acreage v/as to give the already-established producers a
quasi-monopblistic position in the market. True, there
were provisions under the Sugar Act to allow quotas foi? a
limited amount of new, small producers. But the number
that actually received quotas (and hence, permitted to pro-
cess their cane and to have it marketed) was smaller than
expected at first, and their production v/as so insignific-
ant and infinitesimal, that they could not be considered as
an offsetting factor in this quasi-monopolistic situation.
Whether the sugar program can be criticized, from this an-
gle, on its social implications to the economy’’ of Puerto
Rico (v;here a middle class is desirable, yet practically
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From the point of view of the industry, and of its inher-
ent characteristics, it should not be criticized. The su-
gar industry is one that calls for large productive units,
integrated into mill areas, where the economies of size can
be brought to bear on the different contributing factors
such as cultivation, production, transportation, processing
and management. There is a doubt that a limited number of
small producers, independently organized, would have made
for efficiency in the total over-all picture of sugar cane
production in Puerto Hico,^
The graph of page 59 illustrates how the trend
toward expansion of sugar cane acreage levelled off v/ith
the inauguration of the sugar program. Although the mov-
ing average curve shows a mild upswing for the war years,
the tendency is not so pronounced as some observers v/ould
expect. This is no reflection on the shortage of avail-
able land in the Island for the expansion of the sugar crop
since the average 303,000 acres planted and harvested dur-
ing the war years v/as considerably below the 1934-35 peak
of 350,000 acres planted to sugar cane‘s (not harvested,
(1) Lately, with the acceptance of the theory of the in-
efficiency of the small sugar cane producer, there
has been a movement toward the development of gov-
ernment cooperatives — this v^as accomplished through
the purchase of units which already had an established
quota assigned to them. The record of these cooperat-
ives has been fairly satisfactory,
(2) Lynsky, Myer, Sugar Statistics , Economics and PocLiments ,
U,S, Cane Sugar Refiners* Association, 1938, p 57,
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hov/ever) , Rather, it was the result of a hesitancy on the
part of producers to invest in the development and cultiv-
ation of new sugar land, and thus expand production, in the
face of an imminent eventual reversion to the quota system.
Sugar Cane and Sugar Yields
The graphs on pages 60,61, and 62 shov/ the trends
of sugar cane yields per "cuerda"^, sugar yields per "cuer-
da", and the percent of sugar recoverable per ton of cane,
respectively, in Puerto Rico. By sugar cane yield per
"cuerda", reference is made to the average amount of sugar
tonnage produced per "cuerda" planted to sugar cane in the
Island. The sugar yield per "cuerda", and the percent of
sugar per ton of cane are related terms since they both re-
fer to "recoverable sugar" — the difference is that the
first is stated on the basis of acreage, ^^7hile the second
is stated on the basis of cane tonnage.
Of course, there are certain uncontrollable fac-
tors of Nature that v;ould affect some of the yearly figures
in these graphs, i.e. rainfall and its periodic spacing,
etc. Plov/ever, there is reason to believe that, on a long
period basis, these types of factors offset each other, and
(l) The "cuerda" is the unit of agricultural land measure-
ment in Puerto Rico; it is the equivalent of .9712 of
an acre. Since these two units of measurement are
practically identical, the words "cuerda" and "acre"
are used synonymously throughout this work.
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that the moving average curve tends to reduce their yearly-
variations to a minimum, since it is concerned primarily
with long-term trends.
The three graphs show that the rising trends in
sugar cane yields per acre, sugar yields per acre, and re-
coverable sugar per ton of cane, evident throughout the
late ’tv/enties and early 'thirties, tended to level off
during the quota years, and actually v;ent into a mild dox-zn-
swing suring the non-quota v;ar years.
In explaining the long term trends of these three
factors, certain qualifications and inherent characteris-
tics of each must be differentiated. The problem of sugar
cane yields per acre rests more or less squarely on the cul-
tivation and production part of the industry, since it is
up to the individual growers of sugar cane to increase their
tonnage per acre. The matter of sugar yields, either per
acre or per ton of sugar cane is a combination of tv/-o fac-
tors -- the ability of the grower to increase the efficien-
cy of his unit, and the ability of the processor (or, mill
operator) to increase the industrial (mechanical and chem-
ical) ability to extract the actual sugar from the cane
juice. The latter factor is, of course, related to the
financial position of the processor and his capability to
purchase modern equipment. Upon consideration of these
qualifications, it is apparent that they could influence
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the moving average trend curve in these three graphs.
Before proceeding v/ith the explanation of these
graphs, the factors which could limit the drav/ing of con-
clusions from them must be considered. It has already-
been pointed out that v/eather changes v/ill tend to balance
each other on a long term basis, so this constituent is
not considered as a limiting factor in the explanation.
The possible financial embarrassment of a processor, which
may prevent him from installing modern machinery in his
mill, has also been mentioned. Of course, this factor
would have an effect on the recoverable sugar yields. How-
ever, cases of financial embarrassment among processors
have been rather limited since the inauguration of the su-
gar program, and it is inconceivable how this factor, per
se , could influence the over-all average trends in these
graphs
,
The third limiting factor, and the one which there
is reason to believe should be considered more seriously
than any of the others, is the inherent limitation of sugar
cane to increase its tonnage and sugar yields. An agricul-
tural crop cannot be expected to continue an increase of
efficiency continuously, year after year, since, when a cer-
tain degree of achievement is attained, time and energy are
necessary to surpass that standard. Therefore, this limit-
ing factor must be kept in mind v/hen examining the graphs.
However, the degree to which this factor could influence
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the conclusions drav/n from the graph is a matter of indiv-
idual opinion. The author does not believe that the indic-
ations of a levelling off of the moving average curves v;ere
influenced to any great degree by this factor, since there
are no indications that Puerto Rican sugar cane has reached
the high level of tonnage per acre and sugar yield of which
it is capable. By comparison with other producing areas,
the Island* s sugar industry has not reached the maximimi lev-
els of production efficiency which have been achieved in
other areas, such as Hawaii.
It is pure economic and business theory that,
when government regulates industry, the latter tends to lose
some of its efficiency of production and proficiency for ex-
pansion. This situation was witnessed in this country under
the program of price control and rationing.
Under the sugar program, the grov/ers had no incen-
tive for efficiency of cultivation, and thus, for increasing
the cane tonnage per acre and the sugar yields. The amount
of fertilizer used was reduced; older ratoons^ were cultiv-
ated, irrigation procedures were also reduced, and certain
(l) The "ratoon" is the part of the sugar cane plant stalk
which is nearest the ground, together with the roots.
In certain varieties of cane, ratoons grow back year
after year v/ithout impairing the tonnage of the cane;
v/hile in others, the tonnage of the cane is reduced af-
ter the second year ratoon. Of course, the destiruction
of ratoons and the replanting of new cane is an expen-
sive operation.
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off-season operations, such as weeding,^ etc., were cur-
tailed. From the point of viev/ of costs of operation, and
profits, growers did not find it economically feasible to
undertake large cultivation expenses when they had surplus
cane left uncut in the fields at the end of the harvest sea-
son. They found it more profitable to process more cane,
from a larger number of acres, oo cover tneir sugar quota,^
rather than to process less cane, of a better quality. An-
other reason v/as that sugar cane left over in the fields un-
cut for two years loses some of its weight and sugar content.
The absence of efficient cultivation practices,
in the short run, does not necessarily indicate poor manage-
ment on the part of the sugar growers. With the desire to
increase profits as the basic and primary element in any
business enterprise, the economies of cultivation, as exer-
cised by the growers, had to necessarily follow the program
of production restriction.
In the long run, and considering the industry as
a v/hole in Puerto Kico
,
these inefficient practices have
proven themselves somev/hat harmful to the industry. Dur-
ing the war years, when an expansion of production was de-
(1) "Weeding" is an operation usually done by hand. It is
pointed out in Chapter 5 that the reduction of weeding
activity was also due, in part, to increases in the min-
imum wage rates called for under the Sugar Acts.
(2) It must be remembered that quotas were established on
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sirable, the industry found itself faced with the after-
effects of the many years of inefficient farming practices,
and production could not be increased appreciably. In this
respect, however, there were two other contributing factors
a shortage of fertilizer, and an acute drought period in
1943-44.
The Stagnation of Fixed Investment
The quota system, and the consequent absence of
incentive to produce, has resulted in the stagnation of the
amount of capital investments flowing into the Island’s su-
gar industry. The uncertainty of the future in the minds
of certain large producers, coupled v/ith certain political
reasons, has led to an outflow of many millions of dollars
from Puerto Rico into the sugar lands of Florida and Mex-
ico, Writing in 1947, an economist who conducted a
study along these lines while associated vrith the Social
Science Research Center of the University of Puerto Rico,
\^n:ites
The urgency of these measures has been
underlined by the fact that since the impos-
ition of production and marketing controls
little investment has gone into Puerto Rico’s
major industry -- sugar. Although figures
of nev/ and replacement investment in the sugar
industry are not available, the underlying
trend can be seen from an examination of the
(l) Perloff, Harvey S,, Puerto Rico’ s Economy
,
(Unpublished
Manuscript), The University of Puerto Rico, San Juan,
Puerto Rico, 1947, p 19.
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fixed assets, ,of ten representative sugar
corporations, including both large and small
firms
The v/riter then proceeds to show by graphic means
the mild downswing of the trend in the flow of fixed assets
of these sugar corporations for the past decade.
It is evident that some of the more important
economical bases of the sugar industry for Puerto Rico, such
as the tonnage of cane produced and the number of acres har-
vested, sugar cane and sugar yields, and the flow of cap-
ital investments, have been partially shaken by the sugar
program. It follov/s that the Island* s sugar industry, per
se, in an over-all sense, and in the long run, has been
harmfully affected. However, this does not necessarily
mean that the individual producer, as such, has not gath-
ered benefits from the program on a short run basis. These
benefits are discussed in a subsequent chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CHAPJyOTERISTIGS OF EMPLOYMENT AND PROIiIjCTION COSTS
UNDER THE SUGAR PROGRAM
Characteristics of Employment
There are three main operative phases in the su-
gar cane industry: cultivation, harvesting, and processing.
The first is practically a year-round process and, although
not so intensive an operation as harvesting insofar as the
number of workers employed is concerned, it is nevertheless
the first and basic phase of the cycle. The different
steps of the cultivation process are plowing, planting, re-
planting, irrigation, fertilization, and weeding. The
planting operation also needs to be elaborated upon. Most
varieties of sugar cane have to be planted every two or
three years; the planting may be performed in the spring
and the cane then allowed to grow for twelve months (this
is called "primavera" planting)
,
or it may be performed in
the fall and the cane then allowed to grow for fifteen or
eighteen months (called "gran cultura" planting). Certain
types of cane, i.e. the commonly called "Japanese" variety,
need to be planted only once, and its ratoons v/ill grov/
back year after year.
The harvesting phase of the cycle usually lasts
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in June, and consists of the cutting and hauling of the
cane to the mill. Sugar cane is usually allov/ed to grow
for twelve months (with the exception of "gran cultura"
planting) before it is cut from a point just above the
ground by hand, and packed into either oxen-driven carts,
special tractor-pulled carts, or into small, narrow gauge
railroad cars. These vehicles may take the cane either
directly to the mill or to a crane, from v/here it is trans-
ferred to trucks or to freight cars that deliver it to the
mill.
The processing phase of the operation takes place
at the mill, where the cane is crushed and its juice ex-
tracted and then crystallized. The recovered sugar may be
either refined before shipping, or packed "raw" into bur-
lap beigs and readied for shipment,^
Puerto Rico has a surplus supply of labor force
to take care of these different operations. As a matter of
fact, this surplus supply of labor, and the unemployment it
necessarily creates, has been a serious detriment to the
development of a higher standard of living in the Island,
The causes of this unemployment condition can be directly
attributed to two essential factors in the economy of the
Island -- a large population and a high rate of reproduc-
(l) Since the employment provisions of the sugar program
do not apply to factory workers, it is not important
to go into details about this phase of the operation.
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tion of its people, and a dependence on agriculture.
The seriousness of this unemployment situation
is enhanced hy the seasonality of the sugar industry. Peak
employment in this industry is reached during the months
between December and June, when the harvesting and proces-
sing phases of operation are active (known locally as the
"zafra"). It has been estimated that employment during the
slack season is in the neighborhood of 50 percent belov/
that of the "zafra".
The movement of labor towards unionization in
Puerto Rico was characterized by a very slow and hesitant
growth before the middle ’thirties. Writing in 1930, the
authors of the Brookings Institution had this to say about
the subject:
The unions have not been able to surmount
the handicaps of an over-crowded labor market*
and the poverty of their members so as to v/in
signal victories by direct action, wages have
risen in the organized trades, but probably
not much faster than in the organized occupa-
tions.!
The situation described in the above quotation
was gradually remedied by the events that took place through
the ’thirties and ’forties. The history of collective labor
agreements between labor and management dates back to 1933,
when the first agreement of this type, covering the harvest-
ing of the 1933-34 crop, was signed. The practice has con-
(l) Clark, Victor S., and others, Porto Rico and Its Prob -
lems « The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.,
1930, p 51.
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tinued every year since that date.
The Sugar Act of 1934, although it mentioned the
fact that certain provisions for minimum v/ages should he
made in the sugar cane industry, did not provide for pen-
alties for failure to obey these regulations. Under the
Sugar Act of 1937 (and its equivalent, the Sugar Act of
1948)
,
this situation was corrected. The Act calls for
the establishment of minimum v/ages by the Secretary of Ag-
riculture, and compliance with them as a condition for the
receipt of the benefit payments, as it states, under the
section of Conditional-Payment Provisions:
That all persons employed in the produc-
tion, cultivation or harvesting! of sugar
beets or sugar cane with bespect to which an
application for payment is made shall have
been paid in full for all such work, and shall
have been paid wages therefor at rates not less
than those that may be determined by the Secre-
tary to be fair and reasonable...,,,,^
It should be noted that the inauguration of col-
lective labor agreements in the sugar industry of Puerto
Rico was not the direct result of the minimum wage stand-
ards established by the Secretary of Agriculture, since
the former started during the 1933-34 crop, three years be-
fore the passing of the Act, However, there is an indirect
relation between the two,
(1) It should be noted that this regulation does not apply
to the processing phase of the industry,
(2) United States Statutes at Large, 75th Congress, Sept-
ember, 1937, pp 909-910,
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During the first few years v/hen the Puerto Rican
sugar industry operated under collective labor agreements
-
with labor, the bindings between the tv;o parties were not
strong enough to provide for compliance with the agreements
throughout the Island, Since there was an abundant supply
of labor, and the v;orkers were still largely unorganized,
most individual growers found it economically advantageous
to pay wages below the minimum rates called for by the col-
lective agreements. The workers were faced Ti/ith a situation
whereby they either had to accept these lower wages, or else
remain unemployed. Of course, there was no closed shop, and
labor was not in a position to organize air-tight strikes.
Besides, the ovmers maintained that the returns from their
cane were not high enough to justify wage increases.
Another factor that made for a lack of understand-
ing between labor and management was the triple stratifica-
tion of the sugar industry — labor, "coloncs”, and sugar
mills — the last two with individual vested interests. Dur-
ing the first few years in which the collective agreements
were in operation, the "colonos" showed reluctance to par-
ticipate in them. They had two reasons, Pirst, the "colono
refused to strengthen the bargaining power of labor unless
their own bargaining power against the sugar mills was cor-
respondingly strengthened. Mill - '‘colono" relations had
not been too cordial, and there were widespread charges of
corruption and discrimination against the "colonos" in the
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liquidation system^ of the mills. In 1935, an article in
one of Puerto Rico’s nev/spapers stated;
Logically, colonos will have to pay workers
v/hat they demand, hut the mills vdll have to
pay a reasonable return, so that the product
of his cane will be sufficient to pay the just
v/ages of the workers,
2
The Act of 1937 remedied this situation by spec-
ifying the percentage of cane yield that had to accrue to
the "colono’s” account. The figure was established at 65
percent, with certain provisions for a free contract in the
case of certain varieties of cane which have lower sugar
yields. The "colono" was relieved of all responsibility
for any damage to the cane after it was delivered to a pre-
agreed upon place; and the mill was required to grind the
cane within a twenty-four hour period after receipt of such
cane so as to reduce any loss in weight or sugar content to
a minimum. The provisions in the Act favorable to the mills
included the right to stipulate the varieties of cane that
would be included in the '‘grinding contract" with the "col-
ono", and the requisite upon the latter to deliver cane free
from earth and trash. As a balancing factor, a Sugar Board
(1) The "liquidation system" is the system whereby a per-
centage of the sugar recovered from the "colono’ s" cane
processed at the mill accrues to his account, and the
remainder is kept by the mill in payment of the charges
of processing the cane,
(2) Cited in — Gayer, Arthur D, , and others. The Sugar
Ec onomy of Puerto Rico , Columbia University Press,
New York, 1938, p 230.
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was created which was made up of the Goraraissioners of Ag-
riculture and CoTuraerce and six representatives, three each
from the mill-operators and from the "colonos".
The provisions of the law have worked out very
satisfactorily, and they have helped in achieving a more
harmonious relationship between the mill-operators and the
"colonos". Obviously, the cordiality of business and so-
cial relations between these two parties is an essential
factor in the future development and prosperity of the in-
dustry.
The second reason why the "colonos" had refused
to be bound by these collective agreements was that they
were originally made between labor and mill-operators (who
also grow a part of the sugar cane processed in their mills)
The "colonos" maintained that the minimum wages established
under the agreements could be paid by the mill-operators be-
cause of their superior financial position and the advantage
that accrue out of large scale production and the integra-
tion of the growing and processing phases of the operation.
However, they were opposed to the extension of these mini-
mum wage requirements to cover the independent grower. This
opposition was especially strong among the growers operat-
ing on marginal land.
The sugar program, and the generous benefit pay-
ments that accompanied it, improved the financial position
of the sugar producers to such a degree that the arguments
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of the "colonos" for refusing to adhere to the collective
agreements became unsound, G-radually, as the industry
prospered under government regulation, the demands of the
workers for higher i^rages appeared more and more reasonable.
Furthermore, the Act of 1937 removed the problem of mini-
mum wage demands from the bargaining table and placed it
squarely on the shoulders of the Secretary of Agriculture,
Under penalty of forfeiture of the benefit payments, pro-
ducers have found themselves compelled to abide by the mini
mum wage requirements of the law.
It is doubtful that the labor movement in Puerto
Rico would have gained so much impetus without the help of
the minimum wage provisions of the sugar program and the
benefit payments that accompany it, Vages have continued
to increase as the power of labor at the bargaining table
becomes stronger every year. Besides the establishment of
minimum wage rates, labor has gained other benefits such
as a limitation of the v/orking day, double rates for over-
time work, certain health measures, and the right to org-
anize.
In practice, it usually v/orks out that the mini-
mum wages for field labor agreed upon in the collective
labor agreements are the same, or slightly higher, as those
determined by the Secretary of Agriculture, The following
exhibit illustrates this point.
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Exhibit 8
MINIMuT^I DAILY WAGE RATES AS ESTABLISHED BY THE SECRETARY OE































































Source; Gobierno de Puerto Rico, Junta de Salario Mihimo
,
La Industria del Azlicar de Cana en Puerto Rico ,
{Unpublished Manuscript)
,
San Juan, p.R., 1^42,
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There are other provisions that call for a raise
of the base minimum wage rate payable to field workers to
correspond with rises in the price of sugar on a fifteen-
day period scale. Under the determination of the Secre-
tary of Agriculture for the year 1942, the following scale
was established;
Exhibit 9
SCAiJi: OE RISE IN FIELD LABOR MINDiUTI VAUE PJ^TES IN
PUERTO RICO — 1942









Jan. 1 - June 30
Period of
July 1 - Dec.
^3.749 ^3 .999 10 cents 5 cents
3.999 4.249 2C C ' 10
4.249 4.499 30 15
Source: Gobierno de Puerto Rico
,
Junta de Salario Mfnimo,
La Industria del Azucar de Cana en Puerto Rico
,
Tunpublished Manuscript) San Juan, Puerto -^^ico
1942, p 55.
It should be noted that the rise of the base
minimum vrage rate is higher for the busy harvest season
than for the slack season, and that the rise in the scale
is based on successive 25 cent per hundredweight increases
in the price of sugar. This provision recognizes the
right of labor to participate in the profits of xhe indus-
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try above a certain point, and it has been severely crit-
icized by the industry as a step towards socialism* What-
ever the political implications of this regulation are, it
has obviously been a factor in increasing wages and produc-
tion costs in the sugar industry*
Specifically, how have the minimum wage require-
ments of the sugar program, and -che prosperity of the indus-
try under the benefit payments, affected the individual
wages of the Island’s sugar labor lorce? Statistics on
this phase of the problem indicate a definite improvement
in the wage status of the Island’s labor during the sugar
program* Of course, there are limitations in drav/ing con-
clusions from compilations of this type* For example, it
is impossible to determine hov/ Federal expenditures for de-
fense purposes in the Island Just before and during the
war, and the general war-time boom, affected and increased
the upward trend of sugar labor wages*^ In general, how-
ever, the upward trend of wages before the war can be large-
ly attributed to the sugar program* For the war years, this
tendency was mainly the result of the v/ar-time upsv;ing in
business activity, and partly the result of the sugar pro-
(l) Federal government wages for general construction work
were considerably higher than those paid by local in-
dustry for agricultural work* This situation naturally
created temporary beem periods in certain areas and
v/as a factor in influencing the general upward trend
of v/age levels* The war, and the necessary shortage
of goods that accompanied it, is another factor that
affected this trend*
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gram. The following tabulation, Exhibit 10, illustrates
the trend of sugar labor v/ages before and during the su-
gar program.
Exhibit 10
AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS OP WORKERS ENGAGED IN THE








1934-35 10,9 10,9 9,3 12,2
1935-36 12,1 12,2 9,9 16,1
1936-37 12,8 13,0 12,2 17,2
1937-38 14,6 14,8 13,1 17,3
1938-39 15,6 15,5 12,7 25,5
1939-40 15,1 15,5 12,4 30,4
1940-41 15,7 15,5 12,5 30,6
1941-42 19,2 19,0 15,7 32,4
1942-43 22,1 22,5 19,5 b
1943-44 23,3 22,1 22,1 37,8
1944-45 22,9 22,4 22,4 36,8
1 Year ending June 30,
a Classified only into general field work,
b Not available.
Sources; Descartes, S,L., Basic Statistics on Puerto Rico
,
Office of Puerto Rico, Washington, D,C,, 1946,
p 63,
Gayer, Arthur D., and others, The Sugar Economy
of Puert o Rico , the Columbia University Press,
New York, 1938, pp 187, 195,
In reference to this tabulation, it must be
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regulated by the provisions of the Sugar Acts, but by the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, a Federal law. So that,
only indirectly
,
and insofar as the prosperity of the su-
gar industry under the sugar program which made it possible
for producers and processors to meet higher wage demands,
can the Sugar Acts be considered a factor in raising fac-
tory wages. Nevertheless, wages in the types of work that
were directly regulated under the sugar program — field
wages — rose between 1933-34, the last crop year before
the sugar program, and 1944-45, by 93 percent. This per-
centage rise shows the effects of the prosperity of the
industry under benefit payments on wages. Considering the
effects of the minimum wage provisions of the sugar pro-
gram on wages (Sugar Act of 1937), the rise between the
last crop year not covered by these regulations (1936-37)
and 1944-45, was 79 percent. Not considering the- war years,
these figures are reduced to 25 percent and 11 percent re-
spectively.
It is evident that, of the two constituents of
the sugar program influencing wage rises, the benefit pay-
ments and the minimum wage provisions, the former has had
the stronger effect of the tv/o , It is also obvious that
the war has been a potent factor in the rise of sugar wages
since 1941, (Note; Examination of Exhibit 10 shov/s that
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trance of the United States into the wor had no effect on
sugar labor field wages, since they were practically sta-
tionary between 1939 and 1941)
•
How will the Island’s sugar industry be affected
in the future by these wage rises and by the application
of a standard and uniform wage scale for sugar labor? It
remains to be seen hov; the industry will react to these
factors under normal market conditions and the absence of
government regulation* It is doubtful that labor will ac-
cept a reversion to the wages of eight and ten cents an
hour it uses to average before the government stepped in
to regulate the industry* And it is also doubtful that
the inuustry will be able to pay the present-day wages with-
out government regulation and benefit pajmients* Further-
more, the uniform wage scale established under the Act
means that the small employer, the producer on marginal
land, has been paying higher wa^es than his economic con-
dition justifies* So far, the prosperity of the industry
has allowed him to meet the rise in wages and to keep in
stride with the large producers* Yet, if the labor unions
insist on these uniform wage scales even after the with-
drawal of governmental assistance, these small producers
will probably be eliminated from the Island’s sugar scene*
Production Costs
The characteristics of sugar production under the
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plantation system inherently make for the employment and
use of a large labor force. Especially in the case of
Puerto Rico, the use of modern machinery in the cultiv-
ation and harvesting phases of operation have not yet made
much progress. Labor unions, protected behind the theory
that the unemployment problems of the Island would be en-
hanced by the introduction of certain types of labor sav-
ing machinery, have consistently opposed their use.
It follows that, under these circumstances, pro-
duction costs will tend to move in accordance with labor
wages. It has been shown in the first section of this chap-
ter that labor wages have increased during the sugar pro-
gram, It remains to be seen how this factor has affected
the costs of sugar cane field labor v/ork in the Island,
It is almost impossible to draw any definite con-
clusions from the cost tabulations that have been made of
sugar cane production in the Island, The accounting sys-
tems used by different authors and analyzers of the prob-
lem are entirely different, For example, some include in-
terest charges and others do not include them, and there
seems to be a difference of opinion as to the items that
should be included in the "field overhead" charges. Fur-
thermore, no general studies of the cost trends for differ-
ent years has been made.
The following tabulation. Exhibit 11, shows that
cost statistics for field work in the Island* s sugar cane
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industry for two different crop years. The figures in the
different cost studies previously made have been grouped
together here into three major divisions for purposes of
simplification and, under the circumstances, they represent
Lhe clearest and most accurate tabulation that could be
compiled.
Exhibit 11
PRODUCTION COSTS FOR FIELD WORK PER TON 0F SUGAR CANE IN
PUERTO RICO — 1931-32; 1941-42
1931-32 1941-42
General Cultivation ^1,55 $2,33
Harvesting 1,09 1.71
Other Expenses ,46 , 79
Total $3.10 $4.83
Sources: Gobierno de Puerto Rico, Junta de Salario Minimo,
La Industria del Azucar de Calia en Puerto -^ico ,
Xunpubl ished Manuscript)
,
San Juan, Puerto Rico,
1942, p 108.
United States Tariff Commission, Report to the
President on Sugar , Report No. 73, Washington, D.C.
1934, p 119.
The tabulation shows that the costs for field
work have increased by 56 percent for the period between
1932 and 1942, For the same period, field labor wages have
increased by 82 percent (Exhibit 10), 'Phese two percent-
age figures show a similar trend and illustrate the correl-
ation between production costs of sugar cane and labor
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wages in the Island, The discrepancy between the tv/o is
the result of certain fixed charges on the plantation that
have remained almost immobile, i,e, certain mechanical and
animal-drawn equipment.
Furthermore, analysis of the exhibit indicates
that the rise in the cost of cultivation was not so marked
as that in t he cost of harvesting. This situation substan-
tiates part of the discussion in Chapter Four, \>rhere it is
pointed out that cultivation efficiency decreased during
the sugar program as producers, faced with restrictions of
production and higher wages, tended to minimize their ex-
penses on their cultivation practices. These economies
could not be extended to the harvesting phase of the oper-
ation since the latter is obviously the most essential part
of the cycle.
There is no way of comparing actual cost figures
for factory work performed in the sugar mills for the years
before and during the sugar program since the first published
study of this t3^pe was performed in 1941, However, studies
on percentage figures were made in the early 'thirties so
that this phase of the discussion can be approached from
this angle. The cost of manufacturing sugar, or in other
words, the costs of extracting the sugar content from the
sugar cane, have shovm a definite rise on the basis of to-
tal costs at the mill. For example, the cost of manufac-
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turing sugar during the crop year of 1932-33 comprised
24,6 percent of the total mill costs. In 1934-35, one
year after the first benefit payments were made to the
producers, this figure had increased to 32,8 percent. By
1941-42, it had reached a very high level of 48,4 percent
of the total costs at the mill. In other words, manufac-
turing costs have increased, in relation to other mill
costs, by 97,6 percent between the year before the first
benefit pajnnents were made to producers and 1941-42,
It is evident that the sugar program has exerted
an important influence on the characteristics of employment
in the sugar cane industry of Puerto Rico, Under the pro-
gram, collective bargaining and wage increases have devel-
oped and grown in importance. Furthermore, labor has
gained the power to oppose, and practically forbid, the
introduction of certain types of labor saving machinery for
field operations. In years to come, if the sugar industry
reverted to a normal market governed by the pure laws of
supply and demand and the withdrawal of government regula-
tions and compensations
,
the opposition of labor to the use
of machinery that vmuld make for efficiency ’ could very well
lead to the destruction of the Island’s sugar industry. As
far as is kno\,^m, Puerto Rico is the only sugar producing
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area in the world where v\rage and working conditions are
agreed upon hy collective bargaining.
Production costs, both for field labor and fac-
tory work, have abnormally increased during the sugar pro-
gram, How has this tendency affected the profits of the
industry? The next chapter discusses this phase of the
problem.
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BENEFIT PAYMENTS, PRICES, AND PROPITS
This chapter considers the profits, and their
components, of the sugar cane industry of Puerto Rico un-
der tlie sugar program, and compares them to what they were
in the years before the program. The item of profits
serves as a measuring device in determining the immediate
and individual short-run effects of the program of agricul-
tural adjustment on the Island’s sugar industry.
There are several items that must be included on
the asset side of the ledger in considering this aspect of
the problem; some of them are the direct result of the su-
gar program; one of them has been indirectly affected by it.
Benefit payments, the payments made under the Soil Conser-
vation Act, and the molasses payment to the independent
growers, are the three items directly and specifically brought
about by the program. The price of sugar is the one item
that has been indirectly influenced by the program, an in-
fluence which is built around the restrictions of produc-
tion and marketing, the control of supplies, and the con-
sequent uplift of prices.
Benefit Payments
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pensation payments, are the subsidies granted by the fed-
eral government to farmers as compensation for the re-
striction of the production and marketing of their pro-
duce — in this case, sugar cane. The term "farmer" is a
very broad one. In Puerto Rico, it includes everyone from
the small independent grower of sugar cane to the large
plantation owners and mill-operators who also produce a
portion of the cane processed at their mills. This is a
broad classification, yet everyone has the right to re-
ceive subsidies under the program.
The practice of benefit payments was inaugurated
during the crop year 1934-35 with the Sugar Act of 1934,
This act stated, under the section on Commodity Benefits,
that
:
The .Secretary of Agriculturelshall
provide through agreements with producers or
other voluntary methods, for rental or bene-
fit payments in connection with such agreements
or methods in such amounts as he finds, upon
the basis of such investigation, to be fair
and reasonable and best calculated to effect-
uate the declared policy of this title and to
make such a program practicable to operate and
administer, ,,,,, ,1
The program was a voluntary one and producers
could refuse the acceptance of benefit payments. However,
the refusal to accept them v/as the exception rather than
the rule, since in Puerto Rico, the quota provisions were
(l) United States Statutes at Large, 73rd Congress, May,
1934, p 34,
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applicable regardless of the course which the farmer chose
to follow.
In the United States, the provision for benefit
payments has been criticized as a political move by the
Administration to gain the support of the farmers. In the
case of Puerto Rico, where the population absolutely does
not have the voting power that would affect federal decis-
ions, this criticism could hardly be made. Benefit pay-
ments in the Island can be truly regarded as a bona fide
attempt of the federal government to compensate the far-
mers for any possible losses of income arising from the
other provisions of the sugar program and as a measure "to
make such a program practicable to operate and administer,"
The first payment to Puerto Rican sugar producers
as a compensation measure under the sugar program v;as made
for the crop year 1934-35, The original plan was to base
this payment on the "fair exchange value of sugar". In
other words, the compensation payment would raise the price
of sugar to a point at the level of "Ghe pre-war prices
• (1909-14) adjusted upwards to allow for increases in the
price of other necessary commodities bought by the farmer.
This was the parity principle of pricing, and although this
system had been used as a base for granting oenefit pay-
ijien-cs to beet producers in the continental area, it has
never been used in Puerto Rico, The first payment made to
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the Island’s producers was made on the basis of the market
value of the cane that remained uncut in the fields; in
other words, the surplus cane outside the qouta for that
year. The figure agreed upon between the Secretary oi Ag-
riculture and the Puerto Rican producers was $4 per ton of
cane. Accordingly, producers receivea a payment which to-
talled ^12,238,954,
In addition to these direct payments in 1935,
there were other incidental benefits to the Island’s indus-
try as a result of the "molasses plan",^ A portion of the
surplus cane that remained uncut in the fields that year
was converted to molasses so that producers received extra
returns above the ^4 payment from the federal government.
The cane that was not converted to molasses was carried
over in the fields until the follovring crop year (1935-36)
when, as a result of the increase in the quota by 15 per-
cent, it v/as converted into sugar. Consequently, producers
received twice as much monetary return from their surplus
cane of 1934, than the cane v/ould have been worth in the
sugar market. The total benefit payments for this crop
year (1935-36) were $2,157,933, and they were based on a
35 cent payment per ton of sugar cane produced. Since the
Sugar Act of 1934 was invalidated by the Supreme Court in
^ l) Not to be confused with the "molasses payment" which
is discussed in a latter section of this payment.
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January, 1936,^ these payments were made from a special
fund established by Congress in February of that year*
The crop year of 1936-37 was not fully covered
by the provisions of the Act of 1934, Although the quotas
were still in force in Puerto Rico, no benefit payments
through the Agricultural Adjustment Agency were made that
year. However, a $2,500,000 payment was made to the Is-
land's sugar producers through the Soil Conservation Act
of 1936, and it was based on a 12-g- cent payment per c,w,t,
of sugar produced. The second section of this chapter dis-
cusses the Soil Conservation Act, and its relation to the
sugar program, in detail.
In 1937, the Administration prepared a new program
for sugar legislation that would circumvent the decision of
the Supreme Court on the unconstitutuinality of the proces-
sing tax features of the Act of 1934, The result was the
Sugar Act of 1937,
The Act of 1937 re-established the program of ben-
efit payments to producers, along with other features of
pthe sugar program as it stated;*^
The Secretary is authorized to make pay-
ments,,,,,,, with respect to sugar or liquid
(1) The Supreme ^C ourt ’ s decision invalidated certain fea-
tures of the Sugar Act of 1934, For a more detailed
discussion of this phase of the problem, see p 35,
(2) United States Statutes at Large, 75th Congress, Sept-
ember, 1937, p 909,
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sugar commercially recoverable for the sugar
beets or sugar cane grovm on a farm for the
extraction of sugar or liquid sugar
The amount of the base rate of payment shall
be 60 cents per hundred pounds of sugar or
liquid sugar rav; value
The scale of benefit payments under the Act cf
1937 has been so construed as to supposedly benefit the
small producer more than the large one. The rate of pay-
ments has been already mentioned on page 38, and it is ob-
vious that the small producer receives the large benefit
payment, as a percent of his production, than the large
one. The following tabulation. Exhibit 12, shows the per-
centage distribution of benefit payments made to Puerto
Rican sugar cane producers in 1941 under the program.
Exhibit 12
DISTRIBUTION OE BENEEIT PAYMENTS TO SUGAR CANE PRODUCERS IN
PUERTO RICO — 1941
Amount Number of Percent Total Percent
Paid - Producers of Total Payment of Total
0 - 250 8571 72,2 719,531 7.5
250 - 500 1549 13,1 534,804 5.6'
500 - 1000 779 6,6 548,078 5.7
1000 - 1500 277 2.3 343,519 3.6
1500 - 2000 152 1.3 260,760 2.7
2000 - 3000 180 1.5 444,439 4.7
3000 - 4000 86 .7 298,630 3.1
4000 - 5000 62 .5 276,713 2.9
5000 - 6000 48 .4 261,613 2.7
6000 - 7000 22 .2 141,065 1.5
7000 - 8000 20 .2 151,195 1.6
8000 - 9000 10 .1 83,820 .9
9000 -10000 13 .1 123,277 1.3
Over 10000 97 .8 5,379,291 56.2
Total 11866 100.0 9,566,735 100.0
Source: Gobierno de Puerto Rico, Junta de Salario Einimo,
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Examination of the exhibit shows some interest-
ing statistics on the sugar program. On opposite sides,
it shov;s that 72,2 percent of the producers received 7,5
percent of the total benefit payments made in the Island
in 1941; and that ,8 percent received 56,2 percent of the
total payments, Furthermore, 85,3 percent of the produ-
cers received less than $500 each, v/hile some of the larger
ones received payments well into the six figure amounts.
Specifically, three large sugar companies received benefit
payments amounting to almost 1-|- million dollars during that
year.
The question of the social implication of the
system of payment distribution aside, the fact remains that
certain individual companies have reaped abnormally large
benefit payments under the sugar program. True, the table
of payments has been constructed on a graduated scale v/ith
the purpose of helping the small producer. Perhaps these
large sugar companies need large benefit payments to make
up their losses as a result of a program of production ^ re-
striction, Other\sTise, the statistics would indicate a ser-
ious inconsistency of Uev; Deal policy.
To summarize what has been discussed, payments to
Puerto Rican sugar producers under the Sugar Act of 1937
have averaged around $11,750,000 a year. The- following
table illustrates the payments made to the industry under
ITF'
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the Sugar Acts of 1934 and 1937
Exhibit 13
benefit payments received by the sugar came industry in

















a No benefit payment
b Estimate
c Estimate - Under Sugar Act of 1948
Sources; Descartes, S.L., Basic Statistics on Puerto Rico ,
Office of Puerto Rico, Washington, D.C., 1946, p 100,





The University of Puerto Rico,
San Juan, Puerto Rico, 1947, p 57,
Letter - from Mr, A.A, Greenv/ood, Chief, Condition-
al Payment Division, Production and Marketing Ad-
ministration, Washington, D,C,. January 26, 1948,
In passing, it may be noted that the terms "bene-
fit payments" and "compensation pa3mients" are now referred
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to as "conditional payments" because of tne definite pre-
requisites that must be fulfilled before becoming eligible
for tnem, i.e# quotas, minimum v/ages, etc.
96
Payment s Under the Soil Conservation Act
The Soil Conservation Act of 1936 was an act de-
signed to "promote the conservation and profitable use of
agricultural land resources by temporary federal aid to
larmers," Puerto Rico, as v;-ell as the otner domestrc su-
gar probucing areas, was included under the provisions of
this act.
The Sugar Act of 1937 required sugar producers
to follow certain provisions of the Soil Conservation Act
as a pre-requisite for benefit payments as it stated, un-
der its Conditional Payment Provision, that:
The Secretary is authorized to make pay-
ments on the following conditions that
there shall have been carried out on the farm
such farming practices in connection with the
production of sugar beets and sugar cane dur-
ing the year in which the crop v/as harvested
for preserving and improving the
fertility of the soil and for preventing soil
erosion •
.
The first payment to Puerto Rican si^ar produc-
ers lunder the terms of the Soil Conservation Act were made
for the crop year 1936-37. This crop was not covered by
benefit payments from the Agricultural Adjustment Agency
(l) United States Statutes at Large, 75th Congress, Sept-
ember, 1937, p 910.
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since this feature of the sugar program has been declared
unconst itut ional
•
In the years that followed the Sugar Act of 1937
there has been a close relation betv/een the benefit pay-
ments of the Agricultural Adjustment Agency and the provis-
ions of the Soil Conservation Program, The former have
been dependent on the latter to the extent that certain
farming practices must be fol owed in order to qualify for
payments. Hov;ever, separate payments have also been made
under the sugar program through the Soil Conservation Agen-
cy.
Tv/o qualifications must be mentioned in explain-
ing the payments to Puerto Paean sugar producers under the
Soil Conservation Act — payments to Puerto Rican farmers
have included all types of farms, regardless of the produce
under cultivation. Furthermore, in an over-all sense, these
payments have been very small compared to those made under
the Agricultural Adjustment Agency,
The crop year of 1936-37 and 1937-38 were the
only ones for v/hich the Island’s sugar industry received
sizeable payments under the provisions of the Soil Con-
servation Program, Payments during those two years were
made according to the quantity of fertilizer used in su-
gar cane cultivation and, on the basis of 50 cents per hun-
dred pounds of fertilizer, reached an amount of approxim-
ately three million dollars for the two year periods. In
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subsequent years, these payments have been based on the
planting of varied food crops, and the prevention of soil
erosion, and they have dwindled to the point where approx-
imately 90 percent of the producers have been receiving
payments of $20 or less, and only one has received more
than $1000 (1945),^
Despite the pygmeal amount of these payments,
the benefits of the Soil Conservation Program are still
considerable. They are measurable not only in the mater-
ial, short-run, monetary returns that they have brought to
the Island's sugar industry, but rather, in the long-run
effects which the farming practices advocated by the Act
will have on the quality of the soil. The program has en-
couraged crop rotation, the planting of food crops, and
certain measures against soil erosion such as contour cul-
tivation and temporary ditching to prevent torrential rains
of the tropics from washing away the fertile topsoil.
By present standards, these benefits have been
more or less of intangible value since it will take many
years of hard and efficient v/ork to correct the wastes and
erosion of decades of careless cultivation and lack of
scientific attention to the soil. Partly because the bene-
fit payments are dependent on the compliance of the provis-
(l) United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural
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ions of the Soil Conservation Program, and partly because
of the desire to pay attention to the future fertility of
the land, producers have been cooperative with the program.
True, it will take manj'- 3’’ears before something solid is ac-
complished, yet, a start has been made.
The Molasses Payment
Blackstrap molasses is one of the by-products of
the manufacture of sugar, and it is used in the manufacture
of alcohol. Prior to 1942, the sugar mills in Puerto Rico
had been appropriating the molasses left over from the
"colono’s" cane and disposing of it for their own account.
In 1942, the Secretary of Agriculture determined that the
producer-processors (the sugar mills) must pay the '’colonos”
a bonus for the molasses left over from their cane. This
bonus is the equivalent of one-half of the net proceeds :
per gallon of blackstrap molasses, in excess of four
cents per gallon, recovered from the "colono’s" cane. The
four cent provision. supposedly reimburses the mill for the
expense of storing and selling the molasses.
The first payment to the "colonos" under the pro-
visions of this determination was made in 1942, and they
received from the mills approximately 13 cents per ton of
cane. Although there was no molasses payment in 1943, the
payments from 1944 to 1947 have averaged approximately 28
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1 By applying these fig-cents per ton of "colono" cane,
ures to the average tonnage of "colono" sugar cane pro-
cessed during those years, which was approximately 65 per
cent^ of the total cane produced in the Island (Appendix B)
it is found that the total "colono" benefit from molasses
at the expense of the mill, has been approximately 6 3/4
million dollars.
Although a few sugar mills have not yet made the
"molasses payment" to the "colonos", the general attitude
has been that of compliance with the determination of the
Secretary, Of course, the benefit payments to the mills
are contingent upon their sharing the proceeds of the mo-
lasses with the "colonos". However, a few of the mills
have found excuses to postpone these payments, and they
feel that the Secretary’s determination has taken away
their inherent rights to appropriate the "colono ’s" molas-
ses, Although no formal complaint has been made as yet
against the mills that have not made the necessary pay-
ments, the situation may lead to some misunderstandings be-
fore it is solved,
(1) Descartes, S,L,, Basic Statistics on Puerto Rico , Of-
fice of Puerto Rico, V/ashington, D,C,, 1946, p 34,
Puerto Rico Farm Bureau, San Juan, Puerto Rico, Bul-
letin of January 15, 1948,
(2) Smith, Dudley, and Requa, William, Puerto Rico Sugar
Facts
,
Association of Sugar Producers of Puerto Rico,
Washington, D,C,, 1939, p 68,
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The question of the financial ability of the
mills to make this payment aside, the fact remains that
the payments to the "colono” for the molasses of his cane
has helped to improve his financial position*. In this re-
spect, the sugar program can be commended for leading to a
more equitable distribution of profits.
Sugar Prices
The subject of sugar prices before the sugar pro-
gram has already been touched upon in Chapter Two* It has
been seen that the low price of sugar along with other fac-
tors, was the main reason behind the sugar program* The
original plan of the government had been to restore the fi-
nancial position of the industry through the stimulation of
the price of sugar along with other restrictive measures*
The price of sugar to the consumer is made up of
several constituents, and the amount received by the pro-
ducer is only a part of it* An economist, writing for the
United States Cane Sugar Refiners’ Association,^ has deter-
mined that for the first two months of 1938, the price of
sugar of ;|5,51 to the consiimer was made up of the following
factors: ^3*09 (56 percent) for the producer; $.54 (lO per-
cent) for the sugar tax; $*85 (15 percent) for the refiner;
and $1,03 (19 percent) for the wholesaler, retailer, and
(l) Lynsky, Myer, Sugar Economics , Statistics and Documents ,
United States Cane Sugar Refiners’ Association, New
York, 1938, p 5*
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The table in Appendix A illustrates the yearly
fluctuations of the New York price of sugar from 1910 to
1947, It is interesting to note how production restric-
tion policies, as well as governmental policies, have af-
fected these prices. It is recalled from the discussion
in Chapter Two (page 27) that the Stabilization Agreement
of 1933 was an attempt by the industry to regulate sugar
production. Although the effort was an abortive one, the
mere threat of a restriction in sugar supplies led to a
rise in prices from $2,92 to $3,21 the hundred pounds.
The government’s sugar program succeeded in stim-
ulating the price of sugar as shown by the evident rise
during the first three years of the program. Prices rose
from the 1934 level of $2,99 a hundred pounds to a pre-war
high of $3,56 in 1936, an increase of 19 percent. In the
subsequent years, prices continued on the do\>mtrend (with
the exception of a mild 4 cent per hundred pound rise be-
tween 1938 and 1939) until they reached an all-time low in
1940 of $2,79 a hundred pounds. As a result of the war,
prices again resumed the upward trend until they reached
the comparatively high level of $3,50 in June, 1941,
In August, 1941, the Office of Price Administra-
tion fixed the price of sugar at $3.50 per hundred pounds
which was the average price for the last- two-week^p'eriod
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in June of that year. In the first month of the following
year, the ceiling price of sugar at the Hew York market
was fixed at $3,74, This figure v/as arrived at when the
United States government purchased the entire Cuban crop
for that year at $2,65 a hundred pounds, Freight charges
from Cuba to New York were calculated at 34 cents per hun-
drec pounds, and this amount, plus the tariff on Cuban su-
gar of 75 cents the hundred pounds, added up to the fixed
ceilirig price,
^
It is evident from the tabultaion presented in
Appendix A that sugar prices responded favorably during the
first few years of the sugar program. Yet there is no rea-
son to believe that the sugar program was a complete suc-
cess in stabilizing prices. Although the price level v/as
at a favorable level in the middle ’thirties, it tumbled
down to its lowest point ever in 1940, True, Cuban su^ar
was entering the United States under a duty of 75 cents in-
stead of $2,00 a hundred pounds, and this factor, by itself,
could be said to have depressed the price by that amount.
Yet, the program v/as supposed to rehabilitate prices, even
with a low duty on Cuban sugar. The statistics speak for
themselves, and v/ith the exception of the first three years
of the sugar program, thers is no indication that the pro-
gram succeeded entirely in its purpose. Of course, price
(l) Gobierno de Puerto Rico, Junta de Salario Mrnimo,
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rises after 1941 were due entirely to the effect of the war.
One qualification that should be mentioned in dis-
cussing the price situation during the sugar program is the
probable trend of prices on an uncontrolled production bas-
is. Supporters of the program argue that the price level
would have been depressed without the restriction of produc-
tion and marketing and that whole" sugar areas v/ould have dis-
appeared, This probably would have been the case and, al-
though the program could not accomplish the stabilization
of prices at a decent level, at least it brought a certain
degree of order into the price structure of the industry.
Sugar prices, hov/ever, can be looked upon from a
different angle, From the point of view of the producer of
sugar cane, prices can be looked upon as the New York price
of sugar plus benefit payments. The following tabulation.
Exhibit 14, considers the farm price of sugar cane per ton
to Puerto Rican "colonos" plus the benefit payments made by
the federal government. The farm price of sugar cane, rather
Dhan the price of sugar, is considered here because it takes
into consideration the sugar yield factor, and as such, is a
better measure of true receipts; lOf course, producers are
interested in the price of sugar, but they are also interested
in the price of sugar cane.
The total farm price of sugar cane has been ar-
rived at in the following manner. The farm price has been
computed from the statistics in Chapter Four (page 61) which
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show the percent of sugar recoverable per ton of cane.
This figure gives the number of pounds of sugar per hun-
dred pounds of sugar cane and, when multiplied by 20, it
shows the number of pounds of sugar per ton of sugar cane.
It is recalled from the discussion on page 74,
that the liquidation system of sugar mills has been estab.-
lished in such a manner that the "colonos" receive the pro-
ceeds of 65 percent of their sugar v/henever the figure for
recoverable sugar is 12 percent or more. If the figure is
less than 12 percent, the "colono** receives the proceeds of
63 percent of his sugar. Accordingly, the number of pounds
of sugar per ton of cane is multiplied by either 63 or 65
percent in order to have the poundage that accrues to the
"colono’s” account. This figure is then multiplied by the
price of sugar per pound at ITev; York (Appendix A) and the
result is the farm price of sugar cane per ton to the "col-
ono •
"
The figures on the benefit pa;^mients per ton of
sugar cane have been arrived at by dividing the benefit
payments illustrated in the first section of this chapter
(page 95) by the amount of sugar cane production in the
corresponding year (Appendix B) . The farm price per ton
of sugar cane plus the benefit payments per ton of sugar
cane adds up to the total farm price of sugar cane to the
"colonos"
.
To illustrate the foregoing, a definite example
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is explained here. In 1944, the average percent of sugar
recoverable per ton of cane was 11.916 percent. This fig-
ure, multiplied 20 times, shows that 238.32 pounds of su-
gar were recovered from each ton of sugar cane produced.
Sixty-three percent of this amount (the percentage of sugar
that belongs to the "colonos”) is 150.14 pounds of sugar
per ton of sugar cane. This figure, multiplied by the
price of sugar per pound in Nev; York ($.0374) shows a farm
price of sugar cane of $5.60 per ton to the "colono". The
correspondirg benefit payment is obtained by dividing the
total payment of $11,838,000 by the total cane produced
(5,602,436 tons). The result is $2,11.^ The two figures
together ($5.60 plus $2.11) add up to a total farm price
of $7.71.
For purposes of simplification, and with the ex-
ception of the payment made in 1937, subsidies under the
Soil Conservation Program have been omitted from this tab-
ulation. Since 1938, these payments were so small in com-
parison to those of the Agricultural Adjustment Agency,
i/hat they could hardly affect the compilation materially.
It is evident that, from the point of view of prices plus
benefit payments, the sugar program succeeded in raising
the total farm prxce of sugar cane. Not considering the
(l) This does not necessarily mean that every producer re-
ceived $2.11 per ton of sugar cane. Since pajrments
were made in a grauuated scale, it represents only an
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war years, the rise from the 1930-34 average to 1941, was
37 percent. If the war years are considered, the rise by
1945 was 64 percent, For the same period the sugar prices
in the New York market increased by 6 percent and 18 per-
cent respectively (Appendix A)
,
Exhibit 14
FARM PRICE iUID BENEFIT PAYMENTS PER TON
OF CANE RECEIVED BY INDSPSNDENT "COLONOS"
IN PUERTO RICO — 1930-45
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Farm Benefit % which Total
Year Price Payment (3) is of (2) Farm Price
1930-34 §4,26^ b :;h.26
1935 4,14 #1,91 46^ 6.05
1936 4,87 ,28 6 5,15
1937 4,91 ,30^ 6 5,21
1938 3,98 1,08 27 5.06
1939 4,07 1,29 32 5.36
1940 3.72 1.20 32 4.92
1941 4,60 1.23 27 5.83
1942 5,07 1,12 22 6.19
1943 5,22 1.51 29 6,73
1944 5,60 2.11 38 7.71
1945 5,18 1.79 35 6.97
Average
Percent rise 1930 -34 — 1941 .
Percent rise 1930 -34 -- 1945 .
a Average for 1930-34
b No benefit payments
c No payment from Agricultural Adjustment Agency, Payment
made through Soil Conservation Program,
It is interesting to note that the benefit pay-
ments make up a sizeable portion of the farm price of sugar
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cane. For the eleven year period between 1935 and 1945,
this item was approximately 27 percent of the farm price
of sugar cane. It could be briefly stated that, without
the payments of a compensation bonus, the sugar program
would have failed in its rehabilitation program. It v/as
this factor, almost by itself, that succeeded in raising
the returns to farmers for their produce.
Before concluding the discussion on prices,
there is another point which has a bearing on this item
that must be mentioned. In 1944, the Commodity Credit
Corporation extended its activities to Puerto Rico by pur-
chasing the entire sugar output of the Island. It must be
emphasized that this agency is a separate bureau from that
of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and that
there is absolutely no relationship between the tv/o ( as
there is between the latter and the Soil Conservation Pro-
gram) , Nevertheless, the Island’s sugar producers re-
ceived generous returns from the C,C.C, since this agency
purchased the entire sugar crops from 1944 until 1947 at a
price that was higher than the New York market price. Al-
though the Commodity Credit Corporation is no longer in
force in Puerto Rico, the agency’s extra pa3mients to the
Island’s siigar producers amounted to more than 25 million^
(l) Perloff, Harvey S., Puerto Rico ’ s Economy
,
(Unpublished
Manuscript), The University of Puerto Rico, San Juan,
Puerto Rico, 1947, p 57,
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dollars between 1944 and 1947, If these payments were
added to the figures for total farm price in Exhibit 14
(1944 and 1945) they would rise to a higher level of ^,80
and ^,39 respectively.
Profits
There are two sides to the question of profits
in the sugar industry of Puerto Rico, One of them is the
profits of the ’•colonos"; the other, the profits of the
sugar mills.
It is difficult to obtain accurate information
on the matter of profits of the Island* s sugar mills. Many
of them are ov/ned by local capital in the form of family
enterprises and partnerships, and as such, are not required
to publish their annual balance sheets. Therefore, the
problem has to be approached from a different perspective
by examining the financial statements of four of the lead-
ing sugar mills in Puerto Rico -- the American-ovmed South
Puerto Rico Sugar Company of New Jersey, Central Aguirre
Associates, Pajardo Sugar Company of Porto Rico, and East-
ern Sugar Associates,
The limitation in drawing conclusions from the
financial analysis of these four companies are obvious. Be-
tween the four of them, they process 40 percent of the Is-
land’s sugar cane crop, and their efficiency of management
and their production methods are general.ly regarded as
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being above those of most other mills, Hov/ever, in general
terms, and with reservations pointed out here, these
conclusions can be regarded as more or less the average for
the Island, 3very writer who has analyzed the financial
status of the Island’s sugar mills has approached the prob-
lem from the point of view of these four mills.
The basis of the compilation made in the follow-
ing table. Exhibit 15, has followed the pattern of the ones
that have been made by other students of the problem and is
the method used by Myer Lynsky in his book of 1938, "Sugar
Economies, Statistics and Documents," The percentage net
income has been arrived at by dividing the net income by the
capital and surplus.
The general impression among the students of the
subject of profits of the Island’s sugar companies is that
they have been attractive and more than adequate. It is in-
teresting to note how the companies’ earnings were main-
tained at a fairly stable rate during the depression years
and the period of lov/ sugar prices in the early part of the
’thirties. On this subject, the authors of "The Sugar Ec-
onomy of Puerto Rico" have this to say:
In view of the downward movement of sugar
prices, this ability to make profits can prob-
ably be regarded as evidence of three things:
first, the excellence of managerial ability;
second, the pursuit of conservative financial
policies with respect to capitalization, bor-
rowing, and distribution of earnings; and
third, the flexibility. .... ,of the principal
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item of costs, as represented by wages and,
especially, the price of cane.l
Exhibit 15
CAPITAL AKD IlCOl^EE OP POUR SUGAR COM!ARIES IR
PUERTO RICO — 1927-46
(in thousands of dollars)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital and Ret Percentag(
Year Surplus Income (3) is !
1928 $63,496 $8,154 12.8
1929 61,305 1,452 2.4
1930 61,954 3,872 6.2
1931 61,361 1,388 2.3
1932 62,922 3,862 6.1
1933 56,887 3,886 6.9
1934 58,463 5,956 10.2
1935 60,434 5,417 9.0
1936 64,345 8,617 13.4
1937 65,719 7,533 11.5
1938 69,301 4,898 7.1
1939 71,357 4,361 6.1
1940 71,613 4,201 5.9
1941 72,337 4,367 6.0
1942 74,869 13,142 17.0
1943 77,042 10,351 13.4
1944 76,536 5,853 7.6
1945 76,291 7,236 9.5
1946 75,133 9,855 13.1




Sources: Gobierno de Puerto Rico, Junta de Salario Minimo,
La Industria del Azucar de Cana en Puerto Rico ,
n^npublished Manuscript), San Juan, Puerto Rico,
1942, p 155.
Parr & Co., Manual of Sugar Companies , Rew York,
1942-46.
(l) Gayer, Arthur D. and others. The Sugar Economy of Puerto
Rico, The Columbia University Press, Rew York, 1938, p 159
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The exhibit also shov/s that there has been a ten-
dency in the earnings of these companies to increase during
the years of the sugar program. The average income of these
companies for the seven year period that preceded the in-
aiiguration of the sugar program (1928 - 1934) was 6,7 per-
cent, Eor the first seven years of the sugar program (1935-
1941), and not including the war years, the figure reached
a relatively high level of 8,4 percent.
It is also interesting to note how the trend of
income would have been affected had there been no benefit
payments for the restriction of production. Although two
of the companies under discussion have not specified the
yearly amount of benefit payments, and have probably in-
cluded them either in the "Cash" or "Accounts Receivable"
items in the balance sheet, it is possible to drav; certain
conclusions from the statistics of the other two companies,
For the seven year period between 1935 and 1941, these two
companies have had a net income of $12,527,000 and have re-
ceived approximately $6,342,000 in benefit payments,^ In
other words, the government compensation pa3mients have made
up 51 percent of these two comjianies’ net income. Without
(l) Gobierno de Puerto Rico, Junta de Salario Minimo
,
La Industria del Azucar de Cana en Puerto Rico ,
(Unpublished Manuscript)
,
San Juan, Puerto Rico,
1942, p 155,
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them, the income statistics for these two companies cer-
tainly would not look so attractive as they do under pres-
ent circumstances.
The other aspect of the profits, that is, the
profits of the "colono”, or independent grower, for the
years of the sugar program also appears favorable. On the
basis of the statistics presented in Exhibit 11 the cost
of cultivation and harvesting of sugar cane in 1931 - 32
were $3.10 per ton of sugar cane. This figure of cost is
assumed here to be prevalent for the period of 1930 - 34.
The deduction of this amount from the total farm price of
sugar cane for these years shovm in Exhibit 14 ($4.26),
shows a profit to the independent grower of $1.16 per ton
of sugar cane. \Jhen the same compilation is carried out
for the years 1941-1942, the profit per ton of sugar cane
rises to a higer level of $1.36. It represents a 17 per-
cent increase in profits.
It should be noted that these profit figures do
not include imputed charges for administration (they have
been included in the cost figures). The inherent tendency
of the ti^pe of enterprise that the independent grower rep-
resents is to not include the charges for his managerial
services as a cost item. However, a sound system of ac-
counting would include them* It must also be emphasized
that the cost figures in this study have been computed
-.^c .btr.cTnrbo ow:^ ^8•tld^.
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from information on income tax returns, and the tendency
of small business enterprises of this type, especially un-
der the lajcness of Puerto Rican income tax lav/s, is to pre-
sent for this purpose cost figures that are different from
the actual and real ones. Therefore, hesitancy and caution
must be observed in basing on them any financial conclusions
as to costs and profits.
In concluding this chapter, the important points
and highlights should be reviewed again. Prom the profit
standpoint, the inaications are that the industry has _bene-
fitted under the sugar program. Profits for both factory
and fiela operations have increased. Sugar producers have
received generous subsidies, and this item by itself, has
led to Increased profits. It is difficult to prophesize
how the industry would have fared in the absence of the
program of agricultural adjustment, yet the opinion has
oeen expressed that, everything considered, Puer'co Rican
sugar producers have attained a better financial position
unaer the program than they would have otherwise.
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CHAPTER SEVPIN
A CASE HISTORY OE A TYPICAL PUERTO RICAN
SUtiAR CANE PRODUCER
Introduction
The purpose of the presentation of this typical
and actual case history of the business operations of a
Puerto Rican sugar cane producer is to bring together into
an actual and real illustration, all of the points v/hich
have been previously discussed in this dissertation.
The producer in question is an independent grow-
er, or "colono", v/ho operates a 475 acre sugar cane plan-
tation v/ith approximately 60 percent planted to sugar, 30
percent pasture land, and 10 percent to tobacco and food
crops. The property valuation has been estimated at $300
an acre, or approximately $140,000, This amount includes
all mechanical and animal -drawTi equipment, and vrork ani-
mals.
The property is located on the southern coast of
Puerto Rico in a district v/hich suffers periodically from
drought conditions. This land is not considered very fer-
tile, and there is no irrigation, Eor these reasons, the
sugar cane planted consists of a variety which is ideally
suited to this type of land and which is commonly called
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This type of cane gives best results in land which is not
too fertile, it is resistant to drought conditions, and it
needs to he planted only once as its ratoons v/ill grow
back year after year. It is also resistant to the harmful
effects of weeds and other herbs v/hich affect other variet-
ies of cane.
As compared to other varieties of cane, "Japanese
cane produces less tonnage per acre, and lov/er sugar yields
Hov/ever, it sacrifices these qualities in favor of lower
cultivation costs. Since there is no yearly planting to be
done, no irrigation expense, and practically no weeding ex-
pense, the costs of cultivation consist mainly of the ex-
penses for the fertilizer and its spreading in the fields.
Harvesting expenses are about the same or slightly higher
than for other varieties.
The Subject of Discrimination
The producer feels that the ability of his prop-
erty to produce sugar cane v/as impaired by the sugar pro-
gram, Although the production figures in terns of sugar
are not available for the years prior to 1935 (Appendix E)
,
an adequate comparison can be made in terms of sugar cane.
For the five years that preceded the sugar program, the av-
erage of production was 3151 tons of sugar cane. For the
seven quota years (1935-41), it averaged 3093 tons of su-
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discrimination v/hatsoever . The producer nevertheless
claims to have been in a period of expansion v/hen the quota
allotments v/ere established, and that the allotment should
have been larger. It should be emphasized that even if
there was no discrimination in this case, it is no criter-
ia for other cases because of a personal relationship ach-
ieved between this particular producer and the government’s






The production figures for sugar cane and sugar
are shown in Appendix E. It should be remembered that
quota allotments vrere based on the amount of sugar and not
of sugar cane, so that variations in the production of su-
gar cane in this tabulation can be attributed to changes
in the yield of the cane. However, the appendix shows that
the production of sugar v/as maintained at a fairly constant
rate from 1935 to 1941, the last quota year. The radical
change from the 1934-35 crop to the 1935-36 crop is readily
explainable if the material discussed on page 52 is remem-
bered — all of the left-over cane from the 1934-35 crop
was processed in 1936. Other small fluctuations of the
sugar production figures are the result of yearly varia-
tions in the quota and of changes in local consumption.
Appendix E also shows that the acres of sugar
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during the quota years, and that during the war, because
of the removal of production restrictions, the acreage in-
creased, Unfortunately, the statistics for the number of
acres from 1930 to 1932 is not available so that an adequate
picture of the expansion that v/as taking place cannot be
gathered. In general, however, the increase from 170 acres
in 1932 - 33 to 213 acres in 1933 - 34 throws some light on
this aspect of the discussion.
The statistics for sugar production for the years
prior to 1935 are also not available. Consequently, an ad-
equate discussion of sugar yields cannot be made by compar-
ing the trends for the years before and during the sugar
program. In the opinion of the producer hov/ever, the state
ments on this point made in Chapter kour (pages 58-66) are
also applicable to this particular case.
Stagnation of kixed Investment
The amount of new capital investment flov/ing into
the plantation has been kept at its absolute minimum. The
actual outlay of funds, v/ith very few exceptions, has gone
into the repairing of whatever mechanical and animal-dra\m
equipment there was before the introduction bf production
restriction. The only exception of importance v/as the in-
stallation in 1938 of two additional mechanical cranes to
transfer the cane from the oxen-carts to the trucks that
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of new trucks was put off so long that the shortage of
this equipment during the war years compelled the pro-
ducer to dispose of his obsolete equipment and lease
trucks from outside sources,
Helations v/ith the Mill and with Labor
The situation described on pages 73-76 dealing
with the matter of mill- "colono " relations in the years
before the sugar program did not hold true in this case,
V/ith the exception of a situation which has come up in the
last four years and which is descrioed in the latter sec-
tion of this chapter, under the heading of "molasses pay-
ment", mill-grower relations have been very satisfactory
in this case. The producer has always received a fair per-
centage share of returns for his cane from the mill, and,
although the provisions of the Sugar Act of 1937 dealing
with 'this matter (page 78) do mot apply to "Japanese" cane,
an adequate adjustment was nevertheless made by the mill-
operator, He believes that the "grinding contract" vn.th
the mill is a very satisfactory one, and that this is the
result of a very adequate understanding and personal friend
ship betv/een the two parties.
Labor relations have also been, in general, sat-
isfactory, Prior to 1937, v/hen the minimum wage provisions
of the Sugar Act went into effect (page 72)
,
this producer
had been paying v/ages that v;ere somewhat below the average
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for the Island as a v/hole. The minimum v/ages agreed upon
uy the collective agreement v/ere not adhered to oefore
1937, yet there was never any organized protest from the
workers. Of course, this producer had his share of inaiv-
idually shovm discontent from the part of the workers, yet,
there is the belief that labor relations, even under low
v/ages v/ere satisfactory.
After 1937, and with the passage of the Sugar
Act of 1937,which made the payment of subsidies contin-
gent upon the payment of pre-determined minimum vrages to
labor, this producer has adhered strictly to the determin-
ation of the Secretary of Agriculture, luring the ’for-
ties, as the power of labor has increased in the Island,
this producer has follwoed the minimum wage provisions of
the collective agreements (which are the same, or slightly
higher, than those of the Secretary) . If there has been a
few sporadic strikes and vrork stoppa-ges, these have not
been the result of local discontent, but rather, the results
of complete and country-v;ide demonstrations on the part of
labor.
Production Cost s
Appendix I’ shows the production costs for the
unit in consideration in this case history. They have been
divided according to cultivation, harvesting, and other ex-
penses, The last item includes land taxes, interest for
121
funds borrowed from the mill to meet weekly payrolls, su-
pervision, and other general overhead.
The exhibit presents the following interesting
points for examination. For the crop years of 1931 - 32
and 1932- 33, cultivation expenses v/ere abnormally low.
This was the result of financial embarrassment on the part
of the producer due to the generally poor condition of the
Island's sugar industry. During 1934 - 35, cultivation
expenses rose to a high level of ^1,33 per ton of sugar
cane produced. This was the result of a certain degree of
soil preparation before the arrival of the government’s quota
appraisers.
It is also interesting to note how the trend
in cultivation and harvesting expenses substa.ntiates the
discussion in Chapter Four on the lack of efficiency of
cultivation, \7hile harvesting expenses have continued to
rise with higher wages, cultivation expenses have remained
more or less stagnant. Specifically, harvesting expenses
increased between 1930-35, the years before the sugar pro-
gram, and 1936-42, the quota period, by 41,6 percent. For
the same period of years, cultivation expenses have de-
creased by 14,1 percent.
In comparing the statistics in Appendix S v/ith
the production costs persented for the Island as a whole
(Exhibit ll)
,
the discussion on the low cultivation ex-
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penses of "Japanese" cane presented in the first part of
this chapter must he laept in mind. Differences in harves-
ting expenses between the Island as a v/hole and this par-
ticular producer, are negligible,— for 1931-32, average
harvesting expenses for the industry were $1,09 per ton of
cane; in the case history, they v/ere $ ,90, Dor 1941-42,
the figures were $1,71 and $1,74 respectively. Extension
of the same comparison to cultivation expenses for 1931-32
show figures of $1,55 and $ ,41^ respectively. Dor 1941-42
the values are $2,33 and $ ,72 respectively. The items
classified under "Other Expenses" show a similar trend in
both cases.
It is obvious that the cultivation expenses item
for "Japanese" cane is one of the reasons for the IoX'T total
production costs in this case history as compared to those
for the ind-uB try as a v/’hole. This point must be kept in
mind in the consideration of profits presented in the lat-
ter section of this chapter. It is also evident that the
trend of cultivation expenses in this case history substan-
tiates the discussion of a is,ck of cultivation efficiency
during the sugar program as presented in Chapter Dour,
(l) It has been pointed out that cultivation expenses^'for
this year were unduly lov; (page 121) as a result of
financial embarrassment. Therefore, this figure should
be accepted v/ith hesitancy. Perhaps the 1929- 31 av-
erage of $ ,94 cents is a more adequate figure to cd n-
sider.
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Statistics for benefit payments are presented in
Appendix H, It is evident that this item, by itself, has
led to satisfactory profits. For the period in v/hich bene-
fit payments have been made under the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act, they have averaged 43,8 percent of net profits.
This percentage figure would vary somewhat from that of the
average figure of the Island as a v7hole for the following
reason. It is remembered from the table of payments pre-
sented on page 38 that subsidies v/ere based on a graduated
scale of production, and that payments beyond the first 500
tons (10,000 c,^^7,t,) declined in proportion to the produc-
tion, The producer in this case histoiy has never produced
above 10,000 c,v/,t,, so that he has always been covered by
the highest rate in the graduated scale. Therefore, the
payments per ton of sugar in this case have been consist-
ently higher than those of the industry as a whole.
This appendix shov/s also that payments under the
Soil Conservation Program have been very low, with the ex-
ception of the tv^o-year period between 1937 and 1938, There-
fore, they are not considered here as having too important
an effect on profits.
The Molasses Payment
It is remembered from the discussion on the "mol-
asses payment" of mills to independent growers (page 99)
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that certain mills have not complied as yet with the de-
termination of one Secrexary. This case history presents
a definite example of one such case. The mill with v/hich
this particular grovrer is affiliated has not paid a single
cent from this item to any of its affiliated growers pro-
ducing "Japanese" cane. This situation has led to a cer-
tain degree of dissatisfaction in the case of this partic-
ular proaucer. The problem will probably be solved next
year, when the presenx ren-jear "grinding c»^iitract" with
the mill expires ana is up for renewal.
Profits
The profit static oics of this particular produ-
cer, and the gross income from operation, are presented in
Appendix G. It is evident that profits have increased dur-
ing the sugar program. Specifically, and not considering
the war years, this increase has amounted to a 95.6 percent
average increase from the five years before the sugar pro-
gram, and the 1935-41 period.
The statistics in this appendix for gross income
per ton of sugar cane are different from those in Echibit
14 (Total Farm Price) for two reasons. Pirst, it has been
explained under the section of benefit payments in this
chapter v/hy subsidies to this particular producer have been
higher, per ton of sugar cane, than those for the industry
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question receives a very generous transportation bonus
from the mill to cover the carriage of the cane from the
plantation to the mill (this item has not been considered
in Exhibit 14)
.
The figtires for net profit are also different
from the average earnings per ton of sugar cane (page 113).
Eor the year 1941-42, this difference is the result of the
following factors: Eirst, this producer receives approx-
imately ^ ,30 more per ton of cane in subsidies than the av-
erage for the industry because of the graduated scale in
the table of pa3mients. Second, $ ,60 is the result of the
transportation bonus from the mill. Third, ijpl,33 is the
result of lov/er production costs, as evidenced by the dis-
cussion presented previously on the lov/ cultivation costs
of "Japanese” cane (Appendix E and Exhibit ll) , These three
figures add up to !jij2,23 which is still ^.56 short of the
difference betv/een ^4,15 and $1,36 ($2,79), This last $,56
difference is apparently the result of differences in in-
come tax returns.— it is remembered that costs and profits
presented previously (pages 84, 113) are based on income
tax figures, and as such, may not be truly representative
of the "colono’s" earnings. Certainly, even with allowances
for higher production costs for other varieties of cane, the
profit statistics presented on page 113 appear lov/.
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Conclusion
The presentation of this case history substan-
tiates most of the points presented previously in this
dissertation* The difference in earnings in this presen-
tation shows a digression from that of the average of "col
ono " earnings. The following should be pointed out how-
ever, This is an actual case history, and the statistics
presented have been collected from actual accounting fig-
ures, Furtherviore
,
it is not affected by the income tax
feature of the statistics previously presented. As such,
it is a more adequate measure of "colono" earnings,
Even if allov/ances v/ere made for the lower pro-
duction costs of "Japanese" cane, for the transportation
costs, and for the higher rate of subsidies received by
this producer, the figure of earnings presented on page
125 still appears lov;. An adequate adjustment v/ould in-
crease this figure of ;ipl,36 to a higher one of somev/here
between "<^2,50 and ^3*00, depending on the local and indiv
idual characteristics of the productive unit in question.
The statement has been made by the producer in this case
history that:
The sugar program has been the God- sent
savior of my business, Sven though this pro-
gram has resulted in lower..sugar yields and
other features which indicate inefficiency on
the part of producers; in the final analysis,
the net profit factor is the guiding measure.
Profits have increased from around 4 to 5 per-
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cent of capital invested in the years before
the program, to 10 - 12 percent between 1935
1941, The v/ar has increased profits to a
further high level and, for this period, they
have averaged between 15 and 18 percent of
the capital invested, ¥e are assured of a
favorable position in the continental market,
and of benefit pa;^Tnents, for the next five
years (the duration of the Sugar Act of 1948)
It is ray hope, as well as that of the major-
ity of the Island’s producers, that the pro-
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The economy of Puerto Rico is ‘an agricultural
one, and furthermore, it is a one-crop economy. Sugar is
the all-important product produced in the Island, and a
major portion of the population depends on it as a means
of livelihood. This industry was in the process of ex-
pansion when it found itself confronted v/ith a restricted
continental market.
The major points of the sugar program, as exem-
plified by the Sugar Acts of 1934, 1937 and 1948, revolve
around tv7o basic theories -- the restriction of production
and marketing of the product, and the payment of subsidies
to producers to compensate them for the corresponding loss
in revenues. Other features of the program, such as the
establishment of minimum v/-a^e standards, adequate farming
practices, and the regulation of the percentage returns ac-
cruing to the independent groi'^ers for their cane, were also
regulated by it and made a part of the requirements that
must be fulfilled before eligibility for the subsidy is at-
tained.
The reader has probably asked himself repeatedly:
\Ihy did the sugar industry accept a plan that would place
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it completely at t>ie mercy and whims of the government?
The answer is that the industry approved of the plan. Prac-
tically every element in the industry agreed that the tar-
iff method of protection had failed, and furthermore, it
had attempted a plan of its o\m in 1933, the Stabilization
Agreement, v/hich later proved unsuccessful. General finan-
cial embarrassment and economic adversity had brought all
the elements of the industry together into some form of co-
hesive force, Thej^ accepted a plan that was designed to
stimulate the price of sugar, grant generous subsidies, and
in general, “to rehabilitate the industry,”
\’/hether the Island’s sugar industry benefitted
or not under the sugar program, the fact remains that it
was -discriminated against to the benefit of the other pro-
ducing areas. True, the increase in net profits during the
years of the sugar program do not indicate that there was
any discrimination. Yet, the factor of discrimination is
considered here in terms of a comparison of production vrith
other areas covered by the program, and not in terms of ac-
tual monetary returns.
The charge of discrimination can also be extended
to the Sugar Act of 1948, \'/hatever can be said about the
quota system, the fact remains that it should treat every
producing area in a just and equitable manner. Under the
recent quota allocation, Hawaii has never produced th am-
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ount allotted to it, and the domestic beet sugar and main-
land cane areas have produced more than the assigned quota
in only tv/o years of the last decade, Puerto Rico has pro-
duced more than its 1948 quota in seven of the last ten
year. Certainly, this is no indication that a rational
and equitable allotment of production has been made.
The immediate effects of the sugar program v/ere
to restrict production and to stagnate the sugar acreage
harvested. It has been pointed out that the allocation
of quotas to the industry resulted in giving already est-
ablished producers a quasi -monopolistic position in the
market. This tendency represents a t3rpical inconsistency
of Nev; Deal policy. On th one hand, it favors the small
producer by designing a system of payments on a graduated
scale. On the other, it strengthens the power of labor by
making minimum wage payments a condition to the receipt of
subsidies. And still, it creates a situation that practic-
ally forbids new producers from entering the market. All
of these factors have contributed to placing the industry
on the dependence of government to such a degree that there
is probably no other comparable example in the history of
the United States,
Sugar cane and sugar yields have su|‘fered under
the program. Although they have increased somewhat during
the war y ear the trend of grov;th from previous years has
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slackened off appreciably. This has been the result of a
lack of cultivation efficiency as producers, faced with
the restriction of production, have economized in their
cultivation expenses.
The flow of investments into the Island's sugar
industry has also reached a point of actual stagnation. In
the long run, this tendency will probably evidency itself
in its harmful effects on the industry and the economy of
Puerto Rico as a whole. However, in the short run, these
effects are not as yet noticeable.
The provisions in the program for minimum v/ages
to labor have strengthened the power of labor in Puerto
Rico to a degree that had never been reached before. The
social implications of this point aside, the fact remains
that the consequent rise in production costs would be hard
to meet under normal market conditions and the absence ct
benefit payments, Furthermore, this development has been
criticized as a step toward the left and the acceptance of
certain socialistic principles of government.
Sugar prices have increased during the program,
yet, there is no reason to believe that it achieved the
stability in the price structure which it had originally
intended to establish. During .the first few years of the
program, prices rose to satisfactory levels, Hov/ever, in




rt . • . .-
* A ao ce-<I a/^rf el^ i>6it9or*>aXo






nl JE>oslisOiioo» OTarf tnoif^hc^q. to itoXJ'oit^edi afti ,
, . I
“ BHl ' • i? Assanaqxe ndWav'ii'Xi/o
a*b££s?roI ©K^ o^rfi a^’flOjsiJsov^ 'foXI . .

















to -^iaoixood fiita ©rf^ no aiosYis Xtrtflrxfirf nt
9Q^{i7 »nirf Gloria ©rfd- ai ^tarovoK ,erorCvr otaa ooiH o&teu^
$-' ' '
»oXd*feeo£d‘on «s too »ia Bto<i1e
inu^ctXtft lot cB^aoXg afCi Hi u^ftoieivc«q ^rfl
j|L 0ai©t/*I • cX 'foi/sX to ‘xtJWc^f.aiX^ ftoncoJiisno't^a oTiiif io<f^X - 0‘t
p ! •
'
!f * oxC? .S'lctad Aorfoaoi naotf •x^vsn i>erf oet^A © ooiH
T idrtiJFjae'r iToct orlJ ^oMas ^nloii alri^ to ^OiiaoUqcwi Ifilooa .
^- b-TB/f ed blucfw staoo noi touf>oiT nl ©eit i^nawpdflnoo
1- J) eonoacfB exCi* bna anoitibnoo Xeianort tsbcrv tasm o^




1 V *!:o ooite-ttrsoca orf& Jbrta ^tsJ! b’iswod' a sa bosioxli^o
^ ,^naii2n'i©vos to aaJ:<iXocl*i«r
ol:f8iXa.tooe rtia^ieo
S istip^x^oxti 9rfl bOaB^Ttor^X ©BoJt-cq:
*^r 'a- 1
©rfi- bovoijrfoa JJ'X iBd& evsiXatf oi^ nofiao’^ on ai ©t&ift • *^0“^
t- b&d dolt&v ^xnioiJX^B doit^ eif-t ni v.iilicfata
erfl To a'cae^c w«t to^it eii^’^acixtrCI ,^i rcf/^;ia* o& bobneiai
^
^ ai .lorovoK ,afeveX >riDd‘0-fitai^ao oJ eaoT eooluj toe-iaoTi
I; / • I » .
"^tiV cf niaB® ba<i<toxb ^cfi’ otii to o^BX 9dS
,3li>T©I HoX
132
The provisions for adequate farming prqctices
established by the Sugar Act of 1937, and under v/hich, sub-
sidies have been granted to producers under the Soil Con-
servation Program, will probably have a beneficial effect
on the industry in the future. In the short run hov/ever,
nothing very substantial has been accomplished. The fol-
lowing must be said about the Soil Conservation Program:
Subsidies under this provision have been very small of
late and, unless they are made more attractive, producers
will probably not put much effort or do much to cooperate.
If the program is successful however, it will correct many
of the vfastes in the land that have resulted from an inef-
ficiency of cultivation.
The subject of profits which, in the final anal-
ysis, is the ultimate test of the immediate effects of the
program on the industry, appears very favorable. True, ap-
proximately half of these profits are made up of government
subsidies and it has been this factor, almost by itself,
that has led to higher percentage returns, \-/hile it is
practically impossible to determine hov/ the profit situa-
tion would have been in the absence of the sugar program,
the opinion has been expressed that it v/ould not have been
nearly as favorable.
As long as the sugar program continues in opera-
tion (and it has been extended for five years), the future
-cfim ,doxfN^ 'xnJJrrxr ibr^i to toA *L8;^S oilt xd h^r£clX(iai’i}f>
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looks favorable for the industry. Although sugar conaurap-
tion in the United States may decline, producers are as-
sured of a restricted market, an adequate and satisfactory
priue, ana of generous subsidies to augment their profits.
In the short run, the individual producers have
benefitted under the program. By the same token, the in-
dustry could be also said to have benefitted. This last
statement should be accepted vrith certain hesitations, how-
ever, The belief of the author is that the industry, per
se, should not look upon the program on the basis of its
immediate effects, but rather, upon the long run effects
evidenced by a situation that could possibly confront it
in the future in the absence of governmental restriction.
The vathdrawal of the sugar program, if done sud-
denly and \'/ithout previous v/arning, could very likely shake
the economic foundations of the industry and plunge it into
chaos. The years of inefficient cultivation practices, as
evidenced by the slackening off in the trend of sugar cane
and sugar j'ields, will probably impair the Island’s position
to compete in a free sugar v/orld market. The stagnaticn of
fixed investments, v/hich v/ould probably be enhanced under
this situation, will also have a harmful effect on the in-
dustry, The high labor wages of the la st decade would be
YeTy difficult to adjust under normal market conditions. In
this respect, social conditions in liierto Rico are different
r . •>. , oriu lol: av'ooi!
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from those in the United States. Here, labor receives the
highest rate of vrages in the v/orld, and as such, it can be
adjusted dovmv/ard if prices fall. In Puerto Paco, the labor
force is ovem'/helminglj'' large, a.nd by present V7orld stand-
ared, poor and inefficient. However, they are strongly org-
anized and politically powerful. (Their party has been in
povjer since 1940
.) There is a ver3'- strong doubt that the
Island’s labor v/ill accept a reversion to the starvation
wages of a decade or more ago. And, under normal market
conditions, only through the mediimi of starvation labor
wages can the industry compete with other sugar producing
areas such as Cuba, Java, and the Philippines.
If the sugar program v;ere terminated, the only
manner in which the resultant economic reverberations on
the economy of the Island could be ameliorated is by a grad-
ual and time-spaced easement of its features. In this man-
ner, the Island’s sugar industry could become gradually ac-
climated to the return of actual and active competitive mar-
ket conditions.
The author believes tha,t the program of Agricul-
tural Adjustment, or some other program with similar fea-
tures, will probably continues in operation indefinitely.
Sugar is an essential commodity, and as such, it is neces-
sary to the subsistence and well-being of the people of
this country. Furthermore, sugar and its derivatives, prin
Jiff rtocf^vl rtl aeorlj aroil:
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cipally industrial alcohol, are essential in time of \rar.
With the clouds of international conflict that are likely
to haze the horizons of the future, it is to this country*
advantage to have ready access to sugar supplies.
At the present time, therefore, the situation
stands like this. The Puerto Rican sugar industry has
prospered under the Agricultural Adjustment Program, The
extension of this program assures the industry?- of a con-
tinuance of this prosperity for at least five years. There
is hope that it will continue indefinitely, hut the Island
does not have the voting power to affect the decisions of
the federal Congress, The sudden teimiination of the pro-
gram would have serious effects on the sugar industry;
the only manner in which they can he partially prevented
is hy the gradual discontinuance of the features of the
program.
The fact that the industry has prospered under
government regulation, and that it may continue to do so
with the extension of the program, must not he taken to
indicate that the economic problems confronting Puerto
Rico have heen solved. It is not within the scope of this
study to examine in detail the social and economic ills
of Puerto Rico, yet the fact that the Island depends
overi'/helmingly on the sugar industry does not necessarily
mean that the prosperity of this industry vrould solve all
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of the problems confronting its population. One thing
must he emphasized however; anything that v/ould help
the industry will also benefit the Island and its people.
-T1
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APPEllDIX A
SUGAR PRICE QUOTATIONS IN THE NEW YORK IIAIKET FOR CANE SUGAR,








































Source; Descartes, S.L., Basic Statistics on Puerto Rico
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1935 6,391,187 780 , 741
1936 7,592,205 920,037
1937 8,144,291 996 , 346
1938 8,800,294 l,u77,128
1939 6,874,941 851,959









Source; Descartes, S.L., Basic Statistics on Puerto Rico
,
Office of Puerto Rico, Washington, D.C., iy-*6, p 26,
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a - Original quotas, which \/ere suspended in April, 1942.
Source; Descartes, S.L., Basic Statistics on Puerto Rico ,
Office of Puerto Rico, Washington, D.C., 1946,
p 27.
"El Mundo", Puerto Rican nev/spaper, January 3, 1948
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S.L.. Basic Statistics on Puerto Rico
Office of Puerto Rico, V/ashington, D.C., 1945,
p 26,
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CASS HISTORY -- iruOTSR OP ACRES HARVESTED AHI) PRODXTIOH
OP SUGAR CAIIS A'IP SUGAR
1929-30 — 1946-47
Acres Sugar Cane Sugar
Year Harvested (Tons) (C,¥.T.)
1929-30 a 2554 a
1930-31 a 2910 a
1931-32 a 3272 a
1932-33 170 2886 a
1933-34 190 3160 a
1934-35 213 2583 5718
1935-36 213 3232 7654
1936-37 213 3860 7496
1937-38 195 2900 6720
1938-39 205 2775 6725
1939-40 211 3388 7173
1940-41 211 2920 7125
1941-42 227 3999 9530
1942-43 232 4137 9595
1943-44 232 2758 7010
1944-45 232 4184 9127
1945-46 280 3904 9279
1946-47 280 4180 9390
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APPENDIX P
CASE 2IIST0RY -- EXPENSES OP OPERATION PER TON
OP SUGAR CANE PRODUCED
1929-30 — 1946-47
Other
Year Cultivation Harvesting Expenses Total
1929-30 ^0.78 $1.19 $0.57 $2.54
1930-31 1,09 1.10 0.52 2.71
1931-32 0.41 0.90 0.48 1.79
1932-33 0.29 0.87 0.51 1.67
1933-34 0.77 1.01 0,85 2,63
1934-35 1.33 1.00 0.58 2.91
1935-36 0.39 1.02 0.54 1.95
1936-37 0.55 1.26 0.46 2.27
1937-38 0.76 1.76 0,63 3.15
1938-39 1.33 1.60 0.69 3.62
1939-40 0,58 1.23 0.55 2.36
1940-41 0.56 1.38 0.68 2.62
1941-42 0.72 1.74 1.04 3,50
1942-43 1.01 2.21 0,65 3.87
1943-44 1.64 2.80 0,44 4.88
1944-45 1.38 3.13 0,26 5.17
1945-46 1,23 2.81 0.72 4.76






























CASE HISTORY — GROSS IICCME, OPERATING EXPENSES,
AND NET PROFIT PER TON OP SUGAR CANS PRODUCED
1929-30 — 1946-47
Gross Operating Net
Year Income Expenses Profit
1929-30 ^4.67 #2.54 ;i^2.l3
1930-31 3,73 2.71 1.02
1931-32 3.24 1.49 1.75
1932-33 3.90 1.67 2.23
1933-34 4.59 2.63 1.96
1934-35 7.66 2.91 4.75
1935-36 5.22 ,1.95 3.27
1936-37 5.22 2.27 2.95
1937-38 6.35 3.15 3.20
1938-39 6.62 3.62 3.00
1939-40 5.99 2.36 3.63
1940-41 6.77 2.62 4.15
1941-42 9; 78 3.50 6.28
1942-43 7.67 3.87 3.80
1943-44 8.80 4.88 3.92
1944-45 8.44 5.17 3.27
1945-46 10.19 4.76 5.43






























CASE HISTORY -- PAYMENTS AlH) THEIR RELATION
TO PROPITS
(Per Ton of Siigar Cane)
Soil
Net A.A.A. Conservation
Year Profit Payment Percent Payment Percent
1929-30 $2.13 a MM — —- a M — «
1930-31 1.02 a — —- a
1931-32 1.75 -— a — a —
1932-33 2.23 a — a —
1933-34 1.96 a M— — --- a M— .
1934-35 4.75 $3.50 75.7 a —
1935-36 3.27 .30 9.2 a —
1936-37 2.95 a — $0.10 3.5
1937-38 3.20 1.44 46.2 0.17 5.4
1938-39 3.00 1.56 47.6 0.39 1.3
1939-40 3.63 1.45 42.6 0.02 .6
1940-41 4.15 1.45 35.1 0.02 .4
1941-42 6.28 1.42 32.2 — - a
1942-43 3.80 1.84^ 49.0 0.02 .5
1943-44 3.92 2.78° 55.9 a —
1944-45 3.27 1.72 52.9 0.02 .7
1945-46 5.43 2.21 39.8 a
1946-47 5.26 2.07 39.1 0.01 .1
Average 43.8^ 1.6^
(a) No payment
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